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Supreme Court in Multani came the closest to realizing this ideal. The majority in Wilson Colony marked a
low point in this regard, failing to fully appreciate the litigants’ commitment to their collectivist worldview.
Amselem was something of a middle ground, where the Court deliberately preferred to engage with a thinner
account of the religious practice.
Keywords

Religious discrimination--Law and legislation; Freedom of religion; Intercultural communication; Actions
and defenses; Canada

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol52/iss1/4

141

Faithful Translations?
Cross-Cultural Communication in
Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation
HOWARD KISLOWICZ*
In three religious freedom cases pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada—Amselem, Multani,
and Huterrian Brethren of Wilson Colony—religious freedom claimants engaged in litigation
over a religious practice particular to their group. Some have argued that cases like these
can be seen as cross-cultural encounters. How did the religious freedom claimants seek to
make their practices—the succah, the kirpan, and the prohibition on being photographed—
understood to the courts? And how did the courts respond to these claims? In this article, I
draw out two central values from the literature on crosscultural communication: respect and
self-awareness. I then use these values as lenses through which to view participant narratives
collected in a qualitative study of litigants, lawyers, and an expert witness. I argue that courts
are more likely to achieve a fuller understanding of minority religious practices when they
are faithful to the values of respect and self-awareness. This, in turn, can strengthen their
proportionality analyses. Of the three cases, the Supreme Court in Multani came the closest
to realizing this ideal. The majority in Wilson Colony marked a low point in this regard, failing
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to fully appreciate the litigants’ commitment to their collectivist worldview. Amselem was
something of a middle ground, where the Court deliberately preferred to engage with a
thinner account of the religious practice.
Dans trois affaires traitant de liberté de religion qui se sont rendues jusqu’à la Cour suprême
du Canada—Amselem, Multani et Huterrian Brethren of Wilson Colony—les plaignants ont
débattu d’une pratique religieuse particulière à leur groupe. D’aucuns prétendent que des
causes semblables représentent un affrontement interculturel. Comment les plaignants
ont-ils tenté de faire comprendre à la cour leurs pratiques religieuses—la souka, le kirpan ou
l’interdiction de se faire photographier? Et comment la cour a-t-elle réagi à ces demandes?
Dans cet article, je fais appel à deux valeurs primordiales de la communication interculturelle : le respect d’autrui et la connaissance de soi. J’examine ensuite à la lumière de ces
valeurs l’exposé des participants recueilli par le biais d’une étude qualitative des plaideurs,
des procureurs et d’un témoin expert. Je prétends que les cours sont mieux susceptibles de
bien comprendre les pratiques des minorités religieuses lorsqu’elles adhèrent étroitement
aux valeurs du respect d’autrui et de la connaissance de soi. Cela peut à son tour renforcer
leur analyse de la proportionnalité. Des trois causes, c’est dans l’affaire Multani que la Cour
suprême est venue le plus près d’accomplir cet idéal. La majorité des juges a affiché de
piètres résultats à cet égard dans l’affaire Wilson Colony, en n’appréciant pas à sa juste valeur
l’engagement des plaideurs envers leur vision collectiviste du monde. L’affaire Amselem,
dans laquelle la cour a délibérément préféré s’en tenir à un compte rendu plus succinct de la
pratique religieuse, représente un compromis.

I.

METHODS........................................................................................................................................... 145
A.
Case Selection..................................................................................................................... 147

II.

CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM............. 148
A.
What Is Good Cross-Cultural Communication?.................................................................. 150
1.
Typology of Cross-Cultural Encounters............................................................... 150
2.
Analytic Tools........................................................................................................ 152
3.
Respect................................................................................................................. 153
4.
Self-Awareness.................................................................................................... 154

III.

LEGAL CULTURE AS PARTICIPANT IN CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION................................ 155
A.
The Nature of the Dialogue................................................................................................. 156
B.
How Is a Judge to Respond?............................................................................................... 159

IV.

CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE DATA........................................................................ 160
A.
Amselem.............................................................................................................................. 161
1.
Adversarial Dialogues.......................................................................................... 162
2.
Judicial Responses............................................................................................... 167
3.
Litigant Reflections.............................................................................................. 169
B.
Multani................................................................................................................................. 170
4.
Adversarial Dialogues.......................................................................................... 171
5.
Judicial Responses............................................................................................... 173
6.
Participant Reflections......................................................................................... 175
C.
Wilson Colony...................................................................................................................... 177
7.
Adversarial Dialogues.......................................................................................... 177
8.
Judicial Responses............................................................................................... 183
9.
Litigant Reflections.............................................................................................. 185

V.

CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................... 187

KISLOWICZ, FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS? 143

IT IS AUTUMN IN MONTREAL, and the Jewish festival of Succoth is about to begin.

In celebration, three Orthodox Jewish families in an upscale condominium
complex have installed succoth (singular: succah) on their balconies—temporary
huts with leafy coverings where they will take their meals for the duration of the
eight-day holiday. Other co-owners are upset, as the huts are in direct contravention of the complex’s bylaws which prohibit the installation of anything on
balconies. The condo board commences injunction proceedings. The matter
proceeds to the Supreme Court of Canada, where a narrowly divided Court
favours the arguments of the Orthodox Jewish families, holding that the bylaws
infringed their religious freedom.1
Some years later, during another autumn in a suburb of Montreal, a high
school student, having recently immigrated to Canada from India, is walking up
the stairs to his classroom. His kirpan, an article of faith in the form of a dagger
carried by many baptized Sikhs, accidentally drops from his clothing. After being
called to the principal’s office, the student’s family reaches a compromise with the
school principal whereby the kirpan would be secured tightly under his clothing
at all times. The school’s governing board, unhappy with the compromise,
informs the student that he may not bring his kirpan to school. The student’s
family initiates litigation and is ultimately successful before a unanimous Court.2
More years later, during summertime in Alberta, a Hutterite farmer is pulled
over for speeding. The police officer notes that the farmer’s licence is expired
and bears no photograph. Alberta had recently made driver’s licence photos
universally mandatory, eliminating a longstanding religious exemption. The
farmer is given a ticket. He and his community initiate proceedings challenging
the constitutionality of the mandatory photo, claiming their religious obligations
prohibit them from having their photos taken. Though they succeed in the lower
courts, a narrowly divided Court holds in favour of the province, ruling that the
mandatory photo requirement is constitutional.3
These are the basic narratives of three landmark religious freedom cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in the last two decades. They have

1.
2.
3.

Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem].
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256
[Multani].
Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567 [Wilson
Colony].
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generated much interest and scholarly commentary.4 This article returns to these
cases to examine in detail the way the litigants and their counsel told their stories
and the way these stories were received by courts and opposing counsel. I analyze
these exchanges as episodes of cross-cultural communication in which members
of religious cultural communities sought to make themselves understood to
participants in the Canadian legal culture.5 The primary aim of this article is
to develop a set of criteria to evaluate the success of those moments of crosscultural communication and to apply those criteria to episodes observed in the
documentary records of the cases and in narratives told by litigants, lawyers,
and an expert witness. I argue that courts are more likely to achieve a fuller
understanding of minority religious practices when they are faithful to the values
of respect and self-awareness that emerge from the scholarship on cross-cultural
communication.
This article is based on an interdisciplinary project employing legal analysis
and qualitative sociological methods.6 It contributes to the developing empirical
4.

5.

6.

See e.g. Kathryn Bromley Chan, “The Duelling Narratives of Religious Freedom: a comment
on Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 43:2 Alta L Rev 45; Shauna Van Praagh, “View
from the Succah: Religion and Neighbourly Relations” in Richard Moon, ed, Law and
Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 21; Richard Moon, “Religious
Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 201;
Carissima Mathen, “What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence Reveals about Equality”
(2009) 6:2 JL & Equality 163; Benjamin L Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning,
and Cultural Difference: Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony” (2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 25; Richard Moon, “Accommodation Without Compromise:
Comment on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 95;
Mary Anne Waldron, Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
I recognize that the legal culture in Quebec is significantly different from that in the rest of
Canada, explained in part by its civil law tradition and identification as a distinct, Frenchspeaking society. See Sébastien Grammond, “Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des
droits fondamentaux et de la religion: convergence ou conflit?” (2009) 43:1 RJT 83. My
aim here is to capture the moments of communication between a religious culture and a
state legal culture. That all the cases were pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada adds
a common element that justifies a comparison among the three cases. Thanks to Nicole
O’Byrne for raising this point.
The project was the basis of my doctoral dissertation, successfully defended at the University
of Toronto’s (U of T’s) Faculty of Law in December 2012. The dissertation supervision
committee was Ayelet Shachar (Chair, Law and Political Science, U of T), Ping-Chun
Hsiung (Sociology, U of T), and Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens (Law, Université de
Montréal). The defence committee also included Benjamin Berger (Osgoode Hall Law
School) and Yasmin Dawood (Law, U of T), and Ben Schlesinger (Social Work, U of T)
served as chair for the defence.
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literature on religious freedom in Canada.7 Unlike previous research, it centres
on participant experiences of litigation and compares results across multiple case
studies.
The article is organized as follows: Part I outlines the project’s methods
and explains the rationale for case selection. Part II provides an overview of the
scholarship on cross-cultural communication and distils two main values that cut
across the literature: respect and self-awareness. Part III considers the prospects for
cross-cultural communication in courtroom settings, paying particular attention
to the unequal power relationships between state actors and non-state actors.
Part IV represents this article’s main contribution, providing a detailed analysis of
interview transcripts and court documents through the lenses developed in Parts
II and III. Part V concludes by comparing the results across the three cases under
review, which had varying levels of success in terms of cross-cultural communication. It also develops the argument that judges are more likely to have a full
appreciation of the relevant facts when they demonstrate the values of respect
and self-awareness emphasized in the literature on cross-cultural communication.

I. METHODS
Qualitative empirical inquiry, a methodology familiar to disciplines like anthropology and sociology, is less common in legal scholarship.8 Qualitative methods
employ inductive logic, allowing research concepts to emerge from the data rather
than setting out to test a particular hypothesis.9 Typically, qualitative research
is concerned with gathering and analyzing rich data not accessible through
7.

8.

9.

Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 183; Shauna Van Praagh,
“The Chutzpah of Chasidism” (1996) 11:2 CJLS 193; Anne Saris & Jean-Mathieu Potvin,
“Canadian Muslim Women and Resolution of Family Conflicts: An Empirical Qualitative
Study (2005-2007)” in Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori, eds, Law and Religion in the 21st
Century: Relations Between States and Religious Communities (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2010) 339.
For an overview of the use of qualitative methods in legal scholarship, see Lisa Webley,
“Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer,
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010) 926. See also Eve Darian-Smith, ed, Ethnography and Law (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2007); John M Conley & William M O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography
of Legal Discourse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Sally Falk Moore, Law as
Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). The Journal
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law has also published ethnographic accounts of legal
practices, particularly in post-colonial environments.
See Ping-Chun Hsiung, Lives and Legacies: A Guide to Qualitative Interviewing (2010),
online: University of Toronto Scarborough <http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~pchsiung/LAL/>.
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quantitative methods such as surveys. By focusing on the subtle processes of
interpretation at play in a particular social setting, a qualitative approach provides
an ideal way to study the individualized experiences of participants in court
processes surrounding religious freedom.
The primary sources for this project are in-depth interviews. I interviewed
ten participants in three cases decided by the Court:10 four litigants, four lawyers,
one expert witness, and one representative of a community organization that
intervened in one of the cases. The last interview proved not to be useful to
this project except for general background information, as the participant’s
direct knowledge of the organization’s involvement in the litigation was limited.
I interviewed each participant once for 60–90 minutes. The interviews were
conducted in a semi-structured format, allowing participants to construct their
own narratives.
This project also contains a second dataset comprised of documents more
familiar to legal analysis: transcripts of testimony, written submissions, and
transcripts of oral arguments. These texts are used as a source of “triangulation”—
an additional dataset used to verify or challenge the conclusions drawn from the
analysis of interview transcripts.
Once the interview data were gathered, I began the process of “open coding.”
Open coding involves reading the transcripts and documents line-by-line and
generating as many “codes” as possible.11 The codes describe the thoughts, feelings,
and intentions of the respondent at a slightly higher level of abstraction in order
to allow for comparison to other data. The codes can be descriptive or analytical.
For example, where a respondent tells a story about her upbringing, different
codes might mark the emotions she describes, the role of religious ritual, or ideas
about identity. Once the open coding process was complete and I had generated
a set of stable codes, I revisited all the data using the method of “focused” coding.
In this method, data are re-coded in the light of a specific theme.12 For example,
on the basis of codes generated during open coding, I revisited all the transcripts
with a specific focus on the rules of a religion, and again searching for instances
of cross-cultural communication. I used a computer application designed for

10. Case selection is explained in Part I(A), below.
11. One of the codes generated during open coding of interview transcripts was “cross-cultural
communication.” With this in mind, I revisited all the data using the method of “focused”
coding in search for more instances of cross-cultural communication. This prompted further
theoretical research which I then brought back into conversation with the data. See Hsiung,
supra note 9.
12. Ibid.
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qualitative research, Weft QDA,13 to assist with the aggregation of the coded data
and to allow for easier comparison across interviews.
To be sure, ten participants is a small sample. The size of the sample, however,
is less relevant in a qualitative inquiry than the depth of the data collected. The
goal here is to generate new theoretical insights steeped in real-life experiences,
and to provide detailed pictures of a particular context rather than to posit general
conclusions. Another limitation of the study is that interview participants were
all, with one exception, on the side of those claiming religious freedom. The
perspectives of opposing parties and judges are brought to light, however, through
the textual sources discussed above. The judicial decisions, oral arguments of the
parties, and exchanges during cross-examination are all communicative acts that
can be analyzed.
A. CASE SELECTION

As noted above, this project focuses on three religious freedom cases brought to
the Supreme Court of Canada. I chose these cases for four reasons. First, because
these cases had several rounds of trial and appeal, participants had multiple
interactions with the state legal system on important religious questions. Second,
in all of the cases, participants had both successful and unsuccessful encounters
with the state legal system and its rules on religious freedom. This allowed participants to provide insight into a broader range of experience. Third, in all cases, the
religious freedom claimants sought an exception from a generally applicable rule,
making comparisons across cases more fruitful. Finally, because these cases were
pursued to the Court, each has a large and centralized documentary record.14
13. “Weft QDA is ... an easy-to-use, free and open-source tool for the analysis of textual data
such as interview transcripts, fieldnotes and other documents.” Alex Fenton, “Weft QDA,”
online: <http://www.pressure.to/qda/>.
14. For other notable cases involving religious issues decided in the last twenty years, see R v NS,
2012 SCC 72, [2012] SCR 726 (setting guidelines for determining whether a sexual assault
complainant can wear a niqab while testifying); SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012
SCC 7, [2012] 1 SCR 235 (holding that a mandatory public school course in “Ethics and
Religious Culture” did not violate a student’s religious freedom). The Court had not decided
these cases when the study began, and they were excluded on this basis. But see Bruker v
Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, [2007] 3 SCR 607 (holding that the failure to provide a religious
divorce is compensable in damages). Ultimately, I excluded this case because it did not fit
the pattern of a minority group seeking an exemption from a generally applicable policy. I
judged that this lack of fit would make comparison more difficult. The case, however, merits
further study, raising complicated issues of religious freedom on both sides of the dispute. See
also B (R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 122 DLR (4th)
1 (upholding a wardship order over an infant when her parents refused blood transfusions
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II. CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND ITS
RELEVANCE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Most scholarly “definitions agree that communication is a symbolic process by
which people create shared meanings.”15 Cross-cultural communication involves
the creation of shared meanings across cultural boundaries. Following Bhikhu
Parekh, I view culture as a “historically created system of meaning and significance or ... a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human
beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives. It
is a way of both understanding and organizing human life.”16
Culture pervades all communicative activities17—moral concepts and political
and economic institutions are all situated in a particular cultural context.18 It
follows that notions of justice and legality and their associated institutions are
embedded in a particular culture and given shape by their historical context. This
is not to say, however, that communicative acts are culturally determined. Rather,
this project assumes a dynamic relationship between individuals and the multiple
cultures in which they are situated. When individuals communicate, they are
active agents, drawing on the languages, ideas, forms, and other aspects of these
cultures.19 Moreover, many have noted that cultural communities have always
already begun to communicate with each other at some level.20
Cross-cultural communication is inherent in much religious freedom
litigation. Benjamin Berger argues that “the meeting of law and religion is
not a juridical or technical problem but, rather, an instance of cross-cultural

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

on the basis of their religious beliefs). I also chose to exclude this case because it falls less
clearly into the pattern of a minority religious group seeking an exemption from a generally
applicable policy.
Houman A Sadri & Madelyn Flammia, Intercultural Communication: A New Approach to
International Relations and Global Challenges (New York: Continuum, 2011) at 10.
Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Houndmills: Macmillan
Press, 2000) at 143.
Ibid at 143-44.
Ibid at 151-52.
Ibid at 157. See also Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical
Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12:2 CJLS 25.
See e.g. Parekh, supra note 16 at 163. Parekh writes:
Every cultural community exists in the midst of others and is inescapably influenced by them.
It might borrow their technology, and the latter is never culturally neutral. It might also be
consciously and unconsciously influenced by their beliefs and practices.
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encounter.”21 According to Berger, most accounts fail to see that “the constitutional rule of law is, itself, a cultural system ... composed of sets of symbols,
categories of thought, and particular practices that lend meaning to experience.”22
Individual participants in activities within Canadian legal culture, represented
in this article primarily by the judges who wrote the decisions, no doubt have
complex cultural identities of their own. They likely even shared some cultural
elements with the litigants before them—they may have had some familiarity
with a religious tradition, they certainly shared the same language, and they may
have lived in or near the places where the disputes arose. That said, while there
is some cultural diversity on the bench,23 superior court judges in Canada must
generally be members of a provincial bar for ten years, and it is likely that they
received their legal education in Canada.24 When they write their decisions, they
speak principally according to the conventions of the legal culture, using the
rules and symbols of that culture to decide how to legally classify the practices
and then explain that classification in their judgments in a manner consistent
with precedent.
To put this more concretely, in the cases under review, prior to the litigation,
litigants ascribed a meaning to an object of religious faith based on their particular
religious and cultural background. These practices were mostly unfamiliar to the
Canadian legal system, and would likely not have figured in the legal education
or discourse of the relevant judges prior to these cases. In order to make these
practices intelligible to the courts, litigants (through their counsel) were required
to communicate across a cultural boundary with the judges who were tasked with

21. “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & Jur 245 at 246 [Berger,
“Cultural Limits”].
22. Ibid at 246. See also Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006) at 5. Rosen writes, “even where specialization is intense, law does not
exist in isolation. To understand how a culture is put together and operates, therefore, one
cannot fail to consider law; to consider law, one cannot fail to see it as part of culture.”
23. Rosemary Cairns Way, however, conducted a study of ninety-four judicial appointments
made between April 2012 and March 2014. Only one of these was non-white (though the
respective races of twelve of the judges was not known) and only thirty-seven were women.
See Sean Fine, “Tories chastised for lack of racial diversity in judicial appointments”, The
Globe and Mail (10 April 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
tories-chastised-for-lack-of-racial-diversity-in-judge-ranks/article17909652>.
24. Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 3. Alternatively, a person may be named a judge if, “after
becoming a barrister or advocate at the bar of any province, [he or she] exercised powers
and performed duties and functions of a judicial nature on a full-time basis in respect of a
position held pursuant to a law of Canada or a province.”
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deciding upon the validity of the restriction and regulation of the practices.25
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to re-examine the cases and experiences of participants in light of the theoretical and practical considerations developed in the field
of cross-cultural communication.26 Before moving on to look at these considerations, some further discussion of the term “culture” is required.
A. WHAT IS GOOD CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION?
1.

TYPOLOGY OF CROSS-CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS

Fred Dallmayr’s work provides a helpful starting point for distinguishing
successful from unsuccessful cross-cultural communication. He posits six modes
of encounter: conquest, conversion, assimilation, enculturation, relative indifference, and dialogical engagement.27 These modes may appear separately or they may
overlap. According to Dallmayr, cultural hegemony is exercised within national
borders under the terms “assimilation” or “enculturation.”28 In some cases, the
encounter may be marked by “a pattern of mutual adjustment or reciprocal
give-and-take which, in turn, can engender … an ambivalent … syncretism or
a precarious type of cultural juxtaposition or coexistence.”29 Dallmayr terms this
form of engagement “relative indifference,” and argues that modern liberalism
often results in this kind of encounter. Dallmayr is particularly concerned with
the “proceduralist” accounts of liberalism associated with thinkers such as John
Rawls, which “support only a limited procedural rule system or a government
that ‘governs least,’ while relegating concrete life-forms to the status of privatized
folklore.”30 This has the effect of stifling cross-cultural engagement, as so-called
private matters are no longer appropriate subjects for public discussion.31
25. The considerations of cross-cultural communication specific to the litigation context are
further explored in Part III, below.
26. Notably, the participants did not frame their experiences using the term “cross-cultural
communication,” nor was the term suggested to them in interviews because I did not want to
impose my own conceptual frame on their narratives while they were recounting them. The
labelling of these encounters as cross-cultural derives from my own analysis of the data and
engagement with the literature.
27. Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1996) ch 1 [Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism]. Benjamin Berger’s work on cross-cultural
encounter in the Canadian religious freedom case law draws on Dallmayr’s typology and is
discussed in Part III, below.
28. Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism, supra note 27 at 14.
29. Ibid at 18.
30. Ibid at 24.
31. Ibid at 26.
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Dallmayr holds out dialogical engagement as an ideal type of cross-cultural
encounter in which “exposure to alien cultural strands may initiate a movement
of genuine self-transformation ... a reassessment of prevailing patterns in the light
of newly experienced insights or modes of life.”32 Charles Taylor takes a similar
approach, arguing that, in the course of successful cross-cultural communication,
“We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly
taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility
alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture.”33 The
end result is a “fusion of horizons”34—a term Taylor borrows from Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Gadamer construes the comprehension of texts and historical events
“not on the model of the ‘scientific’ grasp of an object but rather on that of
speech partners who come to an understanding.”35 For Taylor, this conversational approach applies to “all knowledge of the other as such.”36 Every partner
in dialogue carries his or her own basic understandings of human life37 and must
take a “frequently painful” journey that “passes through the patient identification
and undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding that distort the reality
of the other.”38 A fruitful encounter creates “a language that bridges those of both
knower and known... . The ‘fusion’ comes about when one (or both) undergo a
shift; the horizon is extended to make room for the object that before did not fit
within it.”39

32. Ibid at 18.
33. Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992) at 67.
34. Charles Taylor, “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes”
in Jeff Malpas et al, eds, Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002) 279 at 287 [Taylor, “Understanding”]
35. Ibid at 279-80. Dallmayr is also influenced by Gadamer, which helps explain the resonance
in Dallmayr and Taylor’s work. See Fred Dallmayr, “Hermeneutics and inter-cultural
dialog: linking theory and practice” (2009) 2:1 Ethics and Global Politics 23 (arguing that
Gadamer’s approach can be helpful in the field of cross-cultural communication as a means
of combating the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis).
36. Taylor, “Understanding”, supra note 34 at 280.
37. See ibid at 284. For Taylor, an individual’s own basic understandings of human life include
“our ordinary understanding of what it is to be a human agent, live in society, have moral
convictions, aspire to happiness.”
38. Ibid at 285, 296.
39. Ibid at 287.
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2.

ANALYTIC TOOLS

To aid in this process of fusion, Taylor argues, “[w]e need ... a threefold
distinction: norms, legal forms, and background justifications.”40 These analytical
distinctions allow for greater clarity in dialogue and make it possible for people
coming from different cultural contexts to agree on a particular norm without
necessarily sharing the same justification for that norm. For example, most would
likely agree with the norm that the law should treat all individuals equally. But
this agreement does not provide a framework for how the norm should be given
legal form, nor does it imply agreement on the background justification for the
norm. Some believe that equal treatment is justified on the basis that all are
God’s creatures, while others prefer a non-theological justification. A successful
dialogue around the shared norm would allow each participant insight into the
other’s background justification, leading to a legal form that could accommodate
all of them while remaining open to future changes.
Dwight Newman expands upon Taylor’s distinction between norms and
background justifications by differentiating “values” from “concepts.” Value-based
differences represent a choice among values that may be incommensurable.
On the other hand, concept-based differences deal with prior questions about
how notions like “law” are conceived. For example, “an Aboriginal community
operating with a conception of law that emphasizes harmony and natural order
rather than positivistic rights may initially have different perceptions about the
way in which a court should adjudicate a particular case.”41 How should those
40. “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in Joanne R Bauer & Daniel
A Bell, eds, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) 124 at 143 [Taylor, “Unforced Consensus”].
41. “You Still Know Nothin’ ’Bout Me: Toward Cross-Cultural Theorizing of Aboriginal Rights”
(2007) 52:4 McGill LJ 725 at 738-39. As can be seen in this example, Newman is focused
on cross-cultural dialogue between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state. His concern is
motivated, in part, by decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada stressing the importance
of Aboriginal perspectives. Arguably, there is a stronger imperative for Canadian courts to
engage in cross-cultural dialogue with Aboriginal peoples than with other cultural minority
groups, given Aboriginal peoples’ prior occupation of the territory that now forms the
Canadian state. That said, at foundational moments in its history, Canada has shown that
it is constitutionally committed to recognizing and addressing religious diversity, though
admittedly at first only as regards Catholics and Protestants. Arguably, this longstanding
recognition that Canada has always been a country in which members of different religions
came together, provides a constitutional bedrock on which to build a theory of cross-cultural
communication in the area of religious freedom. See Berger, “Cultural Limits,” supra note 21
at 248-49; see also Lori Beaman, “Is Religious Freedom Impossible in Canada?” (2012) 8:2
Law, Culture & the Humanities 266.
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engaged in the dialogue resolve these different types of differences? According
to Newman, concept-based differences do not necessarily call for resolution—
concepts operate as “mental placeholders for elements of physical, moral, or other
reality,” leaving room for dialoguers to reach agreements on norms expressed as
propositions.42 When it comes to value-based disagreements, after an attempt to
“carefully understand the values of the other culture and seek ways of reconciling
these values with one’s own,”43 it may be that dialogue partners must leave their
differences unresolved at a given time.44 In other words, success in cross-cultural
communication does not imply agreement. Rather, success turns on all parties
maintaining two key values: respect for their partners and awareness of their own
culturally contingent notions.
3.

RESPECT

Authors from various disciplines emphasize the important role that mutual respect
plays in facilitating cross-cultural communication.45 Writing about translation
as a form of cross-cultural communication, James Boyd White emphasizes the
importance of maintaining respect for diverging perspectives and recognizing
their value. For White, the act of translation
recognizes the other ... as a center of meaning apart from oneself ... Good translation
thus proceeds not by the motives of dominance of acquisition, but by respect. It is a

42. Supra note 41 at 740.
43. Ibid at 743.
44. Ayelet Shachar has given detailed consideration to the institutional structures that might
encourage such dialogues to be most sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable members
of minority groups (usually women and children), suggesting an approach she calls
“transformative accommodation.” See Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural
Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
45. See e.g. Ken Tsutsumibayashi, “Fusion of Horizons or Confusion of Horizons? Intercultural
Dialogue and Its Risks” (2005) 11:1 Global Governance 103 at 111. Tsutsumibayashi
observes that “[m]utual trust and respect are the key to achieving a meaningful intercultural
dialogue.” See also Parekh, supra note 16 at 240-41. Parekh argues that “[w]e can hardly be
said to respect a person if we treat with contempt or abstract away all that gives meaning to
his life and makes him the kind of person he is.” Taylor has argued that there is something
valid, though not unproblematic, in a presumption that all cultures are entitled to equal
respect. This presumption stems from the claim “that all human cultures that have animated
whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say
to all human beings.” Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann,
ed, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay by Charles Taylor (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992) 25 at 66 [Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of
Recognition].
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word for a set of practices by which we learn to live with difference, with the fluidity
of culture and with the instability of the self.46

This notion of translation has much to offer in analyzing moments of crosscultural encounter, where participants may speak different languages and draw
on different sets of concepts, values, and norms.
Respect does not imply, however, that those engaged in dialogue must
refrain from all criticism of other cultures’ norms. Rather, it requires an attempt
to understand other background justifications and concepts before deciding to
reject differing norms or legal forms.47 Admittedly, the line between openness
to other perspectives and moral relativism is sometimes difficult to trace in the
abstract. Parekh helps focus this distinction by contrasting respectful criticism
with the attempt to mould another in one’s own image. For example, it is
consistent with the value of respect to require other cultures to safeguard human
dignity. However, requiring that human dignity be maintained through the
particular framework of liberal individualism is to hold a different culture to an
unjust standard.48 Maintaining the balance between legitimate criticism and a
culturally specific standard requires those engaged in cross-cultural communication to have a strong sense of self-awareness, the value to which I turn next.
4.

SELF-AWARENESS

No individual operates without culture, and remaining aware of one’s own
culturally contingent views is integral to effective cross-cultural communication.49
Richard Brislin and Tomok Yoshida take a practical approach to developing and

46. Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990) at 257 [White, Justice as Translation]. White’s book takes an aesthetic
approach to judgments of the US Supreme Court, arguing that all justice is a form of
translation.
47. Parekh, supra note 16 at 176-77.
48. Ibid.
49. Though this is something of a truism in contemporary discussions of multiculturalism,
Wendy Brown argues that liberal discourses often deploy the notion of culture
asymmetrically. She writes, “Though ‘culture’ is what nonliberal peoples are imagined to be
ruled and ordered by, liberal peoples are considered to have culture or cultures.” See Wendy
Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006) at 150; Taylor, “Unforced Consensus,” supra note 40 at 143; Sherene
H Razack, “The ‘Sharia Law Debate’ in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction
in Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture” (2007) 15:1 Fem Legal Stud 3 at 27.
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maintaining self-awareness.50 They emphasize that those engaged in cross-cultural
encounters must learn to be at ease with ongoing disagreement and multiple ways
of seeing a similar issue.51
The ability to maintain awareness of one’s own culture also requires the
rejection of the notion of cultural purity (i.e., that one culture has developed in
isolation from others). “[C]ultures have always been in contact,”52 and levels of
cultural hybridity are multiplied in countries with high rates of immigration.53
Imagining cultures as pure tends to distort them. With respect to one’s own
culture, it can reinforce the tendency to see culturally based values as natural or
neutral. The notion of cultural purity can also serve to essentialize and oversimplify cultures that are not one’s own, embedding the assumption that another’s
culture determines his or her behaviour, or that an individual or community
is best understood with reference to his or its “culture.” This line of thought
exaggerates the distances between cultures and makes barriers to communication seem more overwhelming. Therefore, although the field of cross-cultural
communication studies owes its existence to cultural differences, a crucial aspect
of maintaining self-awareness is being careful not to overstate those differences to
the point of reification.
This detailed concept of self-awareness allows for more refined analysis in
Part IV, below. Before turning to that analysis, I develop the argument that crosscultural communication provides a useful framework for analyzing legal disputes.

III. LEGAL CULTURE AS PARTICIPANT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
COMMUNICATION
In this section, I build on Berger’s claim that the meeting of law and religion is
a cross-cultural encounter by examining the power relationships at stake in these
50. Intercultural Communication Training: An Introduction (Thousand Oaks, Cal: Sage, 1994).
Other practically minded authors also emphasize the importance of self-awareness and
tolerance for ambiguity, sometimes under the labels of mindfulness and tolerance for
uncertainty. See Brooks Peterson, Cultural Intelligence: A Guide to Working with People from
Other Cultures (Yarmouth, Me: Intercultural Press, 2004) at 89-92; David C Thomas & Kerr
Inkson, Cultural intelligence: Living and working globally (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler,
2009) ch 3.
51. Brislin & Yoshida, supra note 50 at 31, 40.
52. Judith N Martin & Thomas K Nakayama, “Intercultural Communication and Dialectics
Revisited” in Thomas K Nakayama & Rona Tamiko Halualani, eds, The Handbook of Critical
Intercultural Communication (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 59.
53. Melissa L Curtin, “Coculturation: Toward A Critical Theoretical Framework of Cultural
Adjustment” in ibid, 270 at 280.
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dialogues and considering ways judges might best respond to religious freedom
claims that involve alternative cultural viewpoints.
A. THE NATURE OF THE DIALOGUE

When religious freedom claims are litigated, the dialogue about the claims
involves several participants: the claimant(s), the opposing party (sometimes a
government actor), the judge(s), witnesses called by the parties, and, sometimes,
intervenors who provide the court with additional perspectives. The courts’
power to enforce state norms makes any such dialogue asymmetrical.54 The
most obvious aspect of this unequal power dynamic is that, once the parties
have finished stating their cases, the court releases a judgment that explains its
decision and an order that governs the parties’ behaviour. This order is backed by
the threat of the state’s police power.
Relatedly, litigants and their counsel are required to observe particular
requirements set by courts and legislatures when submitting their arguments and
evidence to court. The court retains power over the parties to limit their representations throughout the case. This has a peculiar effect on dialogue. As Diana
Eades notes,
There are good legal reasons why witnesses’ stories are filtered, organised and restricted in the courtroom ... such as the prohibition on hearsay evidence, or the strategy
of a lawyer in examination-in-chief preventing a witness from introducing any matters which may damage their case... . But, the way in which a witness’s story has to
be filtered through lawyer questions is a fundamental sociolinguistic problem for the
ability of witnesses to tell their own story in their own way. It is also a fundamental
sociolinguistic problem for the ability of a court to hear, understand and assess the
competing stories which form the basis of a courtroom hearing.55

The power relation also plays out through a set of prior commitments that
serve to limit the range of successful arguments that can be made to courts. One
such prior commitment of Canadian constitutional law is individualism. Berger
has argued persuasively that Canada’s jurisprudence treats religion individualistically in three different ways: by focusing on the individual aspects of religion
at the expense of its communal aspects, by treating religion as a matter of

54. Berger, “Cultural Limits,” supra note 21 at 276.
55. “Telling and Retelling Your Story in Court: Questions, Assumptions and Intercultural
Implications” (2008) 20:2 Current Issues in Crim Just 209 at 211-12 [emphasis in original].
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choice, and by treating religion as essentially private.56 When contrasted with
alternative worldviews emerging from other cultural origins, it becomes clear
that this individualistic approach is a facet of Canadian legal culture rather than
an objective, neutral interpretation of religion. First, the deep collectivism of the
Hutterite worldview, discussed in more detail below, reveals a view of religion
at odds with the Court’s focus on the individual aspects of religious practice.
Employing Taylor’s terminology,57 the differences here arise both at the level of
background justification and at the level of norms. Second, those who conceive
of religion as a matter of choice approach the concept of religion quite differently
from adherents of faith who ascribe spiritual consequences to matters outside
their control, such as certain indigenous American religious traditions.58 Third,
the notion that religion should be restricted to the private sphere represents a
value-based difference for those who believe that faith permeates all aspects of
their lives and should govern their public and private selves or for whom the
public/private distinction takes on a different meaning.59 Indeed, in many parts
of the world, religion is an integral part of public legal discourse.60 Accordingly,
Canadian law’s individualistic approach is hardly a universal or neutral way to
understand religion.61
A second prior commitment of Canadian law is the distinction between beliefs
and practices. As Lori Beaman notes, though religious freedom litigation always
focuses on religious practices, the legal tests associated with religious freedom
(developed in Amselem) require that claimants first and foremost demonstrate

56. Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ
277; see also Howard Kislowicz, “Freedom of Religion and Canada’s Commitments to
Multiculturalism” (2012) 31:1 NJCL 1. Lori Beaman presents an alternative vision, drawing
a distinction between the subjectivization of religion and its individualization. See Beaman,
supra note 41 at 277-279.
57. See Part II(A)(2), below.
58. See David C Williams & Susan H Williams, “Volitionalism and Religious Liberty” (1991)
76:4 Cornell L Rev 769.
59. Parekh, supra note 16 at 181-182, 201-203, 324.
60. See Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2010).
61. See Brislin & Yoshida, supra note 50 at 51. Brislin and Yoshida note that “[b]eliefs
regarding the importance of the individual and importance of the group … tend to be
highly emotional.” In a review of literature on cross-cultural lawyering, Ascanio Piomelli
notes attention directed to “lawyers’ discomfort with expressions or discussions of emotion,
our extolling of and expectation for linear thinking.” Ascanio Piomelli, “Cross-Cultural
Lawyering By The Book: The Latest Clinical Texts and a Sketch of a Future Agenda” (2006)
4:1 Hastings Race & Poverty LJ 131 at 177.
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a sincere belief, and then connect the practice at issue to that belief.62 In this
two-step analysis, the assumption is that “[r]ituals and embodied practices are
taken to be symbolic rather than constitutive of faith, and as ultimately about
belief.”63 Following Winnifred Sullivan,64 Beaman argues that this understanding
has its roots in Protestant Christianity. Such a neat distinction between belief
and practice is, however, at odds with more practice-based religions or, more
commonly, situations in which practice and belief are interwoven and neither is
truly prior to the other.65 Admittedly, there are significant distinctions between
beliefs and practices;66 however, the conceptual distinction and sense of sequence
(practices follow from beliefs) operate as an unspoken assumption that structures
cross-cultural dialogues in religious freedom litigation—an assumption that is
not shared equally by all participants.
In sum, the power imbalance between courts and litigants is played out on
several levels. Courts can tell litigants what to do, and their orders can come with
significant coercive threats. Courts also regulate the way in which the dialogue
can be carried out by controlling the rules of evidence and procedure and by
setting the terms of the discussion.
Is it possible to give voice to alternative expressions when the power relations
are so imbalanced? James Boyd White draws attention to the role of the lawyer,
who guides his or her client in crafting a story that is ideally both authentic and
comprehensible to state justice institutions:
Think now of the life of the lawyer: in her conversations with her client, from the
beginning, her task is to help him tell his story, both in his own language and in the
62. Beaman, supra note 41 at 279-83. As Beaman notes, the separation between beliefs and
practices is also evident in the Court’s earlier decision in Trinity Western University v British
Columbia College of Teachers, where the Court held that “[t]he freedom to hold beliefs is
broader than the freedom to act on them.” See 2001 SCC 31 at para 36, [2001] 1 SCR 772.
63. Beaman, supra note 41 at 280.
64. The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
65. Beaman, supra note 41 at 279-80; see also James Boyd White, From Expectation to Experience:
essays on law and legal education (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999) at 133-34.
66. Parekh notes:
Beliefs are necessarily general, even vague and amenable to different interpretations, whereas
practices which are meant to regulate human conduct and social relations are fairly determinate
and concrete. Secondly, while beliefs are not easy to discover and enforce, conformity to
practices is easily ascertainable and enforceable. Thirdly, beliefs primarily pertain to the realm
of thought and practices to that of conduct. … Fourthly, coherence among beliefs is a matter
of intellectual consistency and is different in nature from that among practices where it is
basically a matter of practical compatibility.

See supra note 16 at 145.

KISLOWICZ, FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS? 159

languages into which she will translate it ... between them they create a series of texts
that are necessarily imperfect translations of the client’s story into legal terms, and
in doing so they also create something new, a discourse in which this story, and others, can have meaning and force of a different kind: the meaning and force of law.67

In Part IV(B)(1), below, I will consider moments in the Multani litigation
when counsel and the intervening organizations were successful, to some degree,
in doing just this. Before turning to the case studies, however, I examine the ways
judges might best respond in the context of a cross-cultural encounter.
B. HOW IS A JUDGE TO RESPOND?

Given the structural power imbalances of litigation, can judges act in a way
that gives greater expression to the ideals of respect and self-awareness? Jeremy
Webber proposes a judicial ethic designed to avoid claims of gender and
cultural bias. He argues that the process of judgment ought to reflect a “rational
search for normative reconciliation,”68 ultimately producing a synthesis of the
multiple perspectives relevant to the case. Webber notes that the reconciliation
of opposing viewpoints “will often be impossible.”69 His view of judgment is
not, however, meant to produce a single conception of justice once and for all.
Rather, he self-consciously aspires to achieve that which he says is unattainable:
a view of justice “that comprehends human experience in its entire range and
diversity.”70 When judges remain open to alternative normative perspectives, they
are constantly reshaping the conception of justice to more closely approximate
this ideal.
Webber’s judicial ethic assumes a process wherein norms are constantly
contested and evolving.71 From this vantage point, even though a judgment of
the Court is legally final, it does not mark the end of the story for participants
or for the contest over norms. While judges may have powerful voices, other
actors can nonetheless continue the conversation after judgment is rendered.
Within the state’s legal institutions, this may take the form of a dialogue between
67. Justice as Translation, supra note 46 at 260-61.
68. Jeremy Webber, “A Judicial Ethic for a Pluralistic Age” in Omid Payrow Shabani, ed,
Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 2007)
at 88.
69. Ibid at 87-88.
70. Ibid at 93.
71. This echoes Taylor’s work described in Part II(A)(1), above. There is also a resonance here
with cross-cultural communication scholars who take either a “co-culturation” or dialectical
approach to cultural production. In both these views, cultures are constantly evolving. See
Curtin, supra note 53 at 277-78; Martin & Nakayama, supra note 52 at 75.
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disagreeing judges, between courts and legislatures, or between legislatures and
government-sponsored initiatives.72 The contest extends further still, as cultural
communities, professional associations, academic commentators, media organizations, and other social groups respond to the judicial decisions in their own
ways.73
This ongoing contest may reflect the “inherently indeterminate” nature
of the complex reasoning involved in resolving normative conflicts linked
to cultural differences.74 More optimistically, it can also be taken to indicate
openness to new ideas and potential for mutual change arising from dialogue.
Becoming comfortable with this ongoing contest may be a key to participating
effectively in the dialogue. In this respect, one lesson of cross-cultural communication for judges is that their decisions are final only as far as the law is concerned.
The impact of the particular decision and its future applications will likely be a
matter of further contest and dialogue between legal institutions, communities,
and individuals. Maintaining this humility stems from the more general values of
respect and self-awareness identified above. Courts must respect the independent
agency of the parties before them and remain aware that the authority of their
decisions is an aspect of the prevailing constitutional culture rather than a
culturally neutral attribute.

IV. CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE DATA
Having examined general considerations related to cross-cultural dialogue and
some concerns more specific to the legal context, I now apply these insights to the
data collected for the three cases under review. The discussion below will consider
some of the cross-cultural encounters leading up to litigation and analyze the
dialogue that occurred in the context of the litigation process. The very nature
of this process creates a structural obstacle for meaningful exchange, as the
parties are expected to behave as adversaries. For this reason, the encounters that
72. See Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The
Canadian Experience” (2005) 40:3 Tex Int’l LJ 537; Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell,
“The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights
Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 74.
73. See Martha Minow, “Pluralisms” (1988) 21:4 Conn L Rev 965; Shauna Van Praagh,
“Identity’s Importance: Reflections of – and on – Diversity” (2001) 80:1&2 Can Bar Rev
605.
74. James Tully, “The Practice of Law-Making and Problem of Difference: An Introduction
to the Field” in Omid Payrow Shabani, ed, Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate
(Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 2007) 19 at 31.
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occurred between the opposing parties were often marked by a lack of respect or
self-awareness. Nevertheless, exploring in detail how religious freedom claimants
sought to make themselves understood to opposing parties and to the courts
reveals significant moments of cross-cultural communication. I will argue that
the values of respect and self-awareness were crucial in determining the success
of a cross-cultural exchange. A consideration of these narratives demonstrates
that litigants often attribute their lack of success to a court’s misunderstanding
of their cultural practices. It can be challenging to distinguish a litigation failure
from a communication failure. One might expect any unsuccessful litigant to feel
that the court did not understand his or her perspective, regardless of whether
the case involved cross-cultural communication. For the purposes of this article,
a failure of cross-cultural communication is found when there is evidence that a
court has deliberately avoided engaging with an unfamiliar cultural practice or
demonstrates that it does not take the practice—rather than its regulation—on
the terms presented by the practitioners. In other words, I believe it possible for
a court to communicate effectively across a cultural barrier while finding against
a religious freedom claimant. In the cases under review, I find, however, that the
more effective cross-cultural communication is to be found where the religious
freedom claimants were successful.
A. AMSELEM

As noted above, Amselem centred on the installation of succoth in a condominium
complex in apparent contravention of the complex’s bylaws. Succoth are huts
with leafy or other vegetative roof coverings that serve as a remembrance of the
temporary dwellings the Israelites used en route from Egypt to Canaan. Some
Jews erect succoth during the annual eight-day holiday of Succoth. A central
dispute at trial was whether there was an obligation in the Jewish faith to erect
one’s own succah or whether using a communal succah would suffice.
One litigant described his experience at a meeting of the co-owners of his
building prior to the litigation in Amselem in profoundly negative terms. He
felt that he had been treated as a religious fundamentalist—a “Khomeini.”75 He
viewed this as a moment of misrecognition by the other co-owners that made
him wish never to return to another co-owners meeting. It is apparent that the
litigant did not feel that he had been accorded respect required for a successful
cross-cultural exchange. This may partially account for the escalation of the
dispute. Indeed, according to the litigant, his interactions with the condo board
75. Interview of Litigant 2 [nd]. The absence of direct quotations in this article is due to the fact
that the interview was conducted in French and translated to English.
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of co-owners left him feeling a “scent of anti-Semitism,”76 which contributed
to his decision to pursue litigation. As an example of this, he pointed to the
condo board’s position that a super-majority of 90 per cent of the voting shares
in the building would be required to allow for the succah installation, which the
litigant characterized as “à la Saddam Hussein.”77 Interestingly, as can be seen
in these passages, the litigant drew on his own culturally based perceptions of
who qualifies as a villain (i.e., Hussein and Khomeini) to communicate to the
interviewer his feeling of having been treated unfairly.
1.

ADVERSARIAL DIALOGUES

The litigation began with the parties exchanging affidavits followed by crossexamination of each witness by opposing counsel. In this context, counsel for
the condo board demonstrated some of the skills and values associated with
successful cross-cultural communication. For example, in prefacing questions
about witnesses’ succah practices, opposing counsel demonstrated self-awareness,
explaining that his own knowledge of the practice was limited:
[Y]ou have to bear in mind that I personally may not know, and although I have
some basic idea of what a succah is, what it stands for, what it means to you, I may
ask you questions unfortunately that you may find either amusing or maybe not
relevant.78
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid. A change to a condominium’s by-laws should not ordinarily require this super-majority,
but a simple majority. See art 1096 CCQ. Amendments to a condominium’s “destination,”
however, do require a 90 per cent super-majority. See art 1098 CCQ. While the lower
courts held that the restrictions on ownership were justified by the building’s destination,
the amendments were not part of the building’s destination. Though there may be arguable
merit to the claim that the upscale nature of the building implied its exterior uniformity,
this seems to be more of a case of legal posturing. Though this did not become a point of
contention before the courts, a transcript of a co-owners’ meeting submitted to the courts
supports the litigant’s claim that the condo board took this position in the events leading to
the litigation. There, the condo board indicated that it would not hold a vote, as 75 per cent
of the co-owners were not present. This level of quorum is only required for super-majority
decisions (ibid).
78. Amselem, supra note 1 (Cross-examination of Gabriel Fonfeder, 22 January 1998, Respondent’s
Record, vol 1 at 190) [Fonfeder Cross-examination]. Counsel made a similar statement to
other witnesses. See Amselem, supra note 1 (Cross-examination of Thomas Klein, 29 January
1998, Respondent’s Record, vol 1 at 233) [Klein Cross-examination]; Amselem, supra note 1
(Cross-examination of Moïse Amselem, 3 February 1998, Respondent’s Record, vol 1 at 281)
[Amselem Cross-examination]. Counsel went on to ask a series of questions about the history
of each litigant’s succah practice. For example, he sought information about a litigant’s first
experience in a succah, and then about his use of a succah during his youth, his married life, and
before and after his immigration to Canada (Fonfeder Cross-examination at 191-93).
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Displaying his inquisitiveness, counsel sought clarification regarding the
internal complexities of Montreal’s Jewish community, specifically the differences
in succah practices between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews.79 This spirit of
openness led to some poignant moments of cross-cultural communication. For
example, in order to explain the holiday of Shemini Atzereth which immediately
follows the Succoth holiday but is not technically part of Succoth,80 one litigant
explained that he continued to use the succah during those days to express his
desire to be near to God. This element of his practice is meant to express: “we
want to stay one more day with You, God ... we don’t want to leave abruptly ...
like someone accompanying a departing king.”81 The analogy to the departing
king makes an unfamiliar cultural practice accessible to opposing counsel.
If these conversations were held outside the litigation context, the behaviour
of the counsel for the condo board might be read simply as curious, seeking to
understand the meaning of the succah to the litigant. But the litigation context
alters that dynamic. In addition to learning about the holiday and community,82
opposing counsel sought to draw out inconsistencies in the litigants’ religious
practice or other weaknesses in their case. For example, counsel for the condo
board was concerned with times during a litigant’s life when he did not observe
the succah practice; times when a litigant did not have a succah at his own house;
whether, when a litigant was married but did not have children, he felt “morally
obliged to go to [his sister’s succah] or could ... have skipped a day”; whether
a litigant ate his dinners but not his lunches in the succah, or was able to eat
snacks outside the succah; and whether the litigant’s friends and relatives built
succoth.83 Of course, the condo board’s counsel cannot be faulted for all this. It
was his professional obligation to uncover inconsistencies in the facts alleged by
the opposing parties. This is simply one of the structural obstacles to effective
79. Amselem Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 281-83 [translated by author].
80. See Amselem, supra note 1 (Expert Report of Rabbi B Barry Levy, Ph D, at 2, Appellant’s
Record, vol 2 at 323).
81. Amselem Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 308 [translated by author].
82. Counsel was interested, for example, in learning about which days are considered “holy
days,” the holiday’s timing in relation to other holidays and the Sabbath, and during
which days of Succoth it was permissible to work. He also asked about the requirements
for a succah’s roof. Moreover, through some general questions, he learned of the various
ritual practices carried out by the litigants, each in his own fashion. See Fonfeder
Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 194-197; Klein Cross-examination, supra note 78 at
234-35; Amselem Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 284, 296-97, 299.
83. Fonfeder Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 193-94, 205, 208, 213; Klein
Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 232, 238-40, 244; Amselem Cross-examination, supra
note 78 at 292, 306-307, 309, 312-16.
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communication in the litigation context. Arguably, this contributed to some of
the communication breakdowns to which I now turn.
In some exchanges, opposing counsel showed tendencies associated with
poor cross-cultural communication, imposing his own assumptions on litigants.
For instance, he adopted the assumption, discussed in Part III(A), above, that
practices and beliefs are neatly distinguishable. He asked the litigant, “To you
what does ... the period of Succoth represent?” The litigant responded, “It’s a
holiday that I keep as I was [taught] from my childhood.” This answer did not
satisfy the condo board’s counsel, so he continued, “But what meaning does it
have, do you know ... what it represents in the Jewish religion?” The litigant’s
answer was somewhat vague, as if the question itself did not make sense to him.
He said, “The story is subscribed [sic] in the Book, it’s part of the harvest day and
part of the remembrance of the difficulties that the Jews went through from the
expulsion of Egypt.”84 A similar exchange occurred when opposing counsel asked
a different witness about the mezuzah85 he had affixed to his doorpost:
Q- What message does [the mezuzah] send?
A- I can’t really tell you exactly what, - if it is ...
Q- I will ask you a more simpler question. Why did you put one up?
A- I put one up because it is a biblical obligation to put one on your door.86

The communication difficulties in these exchanges suggest that the “belief
before practice” paradigm was not a perfect fit for at least some of the litigants.
In Newman’s terminology, this represents a conceptual difference regarding the
relationship between norms and their background justifications. Though the two
are related in the litigants’ accounts, the relationship is not linear—practice and
belief reinforce one another, and neither is prior to the other.
Notably, however, another litigant independently described the “message” in
Succoth as the shedding of material goods and the recognition of life’s fragility and
God’s power. This signals some variations in approach among the succah-building
84. Fonfeder Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 205-206.
85. The website of the Orthodox Union, an organization of Orthodox Jews, describes the
mezuzah as “a small scroll of parchment on which are written two Biblical passages ... [Put
in a case, it] is then nailed or screwed or glued to the right side of the door, in the upper
third part of the door-post, leaning inward towards the interior of the house or the room.”
Orthodox Union, “Mezuzah,” online: <http://www.ou.org/judaism-101/glossary/mezuzah/>.
86. Klein Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 264.
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litigants, with at least one narrative fitting more closely into the belief-begettingpractice paradigm. The litigant and opposing counsel also engaged, however, in
a prolonged discussion regarding whether the litigant had a religious obligation
to eat warm food on Succoth or if he could rather satisfy his religious obligations
by eating cold food. After a series of oblique answers, the litigant finally said: “It’s
part of the holiday ... On a holiday you must make things as pleasant as possible
for you and for the Lord.”87 Taken together, these statements indicate that the
notion that one could find a textual source for all aspects of practice is overly
simplistic, that the sources of the obligation are multiple, and that the belief and
the practice are not easily separated. Indeed, the litigant went on to explain, “the
succah envelops the human being in its entirety, in its body and in its soul.”88
Further communication difficulties arose as counsel attempted to draw other
distinctions that did not seem relevant to litigants. For instance, counsel posed
the following question of one litigant: “Now, if I was to try to separate ... the
religious tradition from the tradition itself that is not necessarily religious, would
you say that to bring expensive items is a religious obligation or is it more of an
old tradition to make it more festive?”89 The litigant resisted this compartmentalization: “It’s actually a religious affair, it’s even written somewhere in the Holy
Books that you should bring in expensive nice things to your place to have the
festive [sic] in its full value.”90
In the same vein, in discussing whether a litigant took a meal in the succah,
counsel attempted to distinguish between a complete meal and a symbolic meal
where only bread and wine are eaten. The litigant answered that “there is no
symbolic meal,” and went on to discuss some of the minutiae of what constitutes
a meal in Jewish law (thirty grams of bread, in the litigant’s account).91 Thus,
while there was a distinction between what did or did not constitute a meal
in the litigant’s view, the notion of the symbolic meal did not make sense.
Likewise, another litigant had difficulty answering counsel’s question about the
relative importance of Succoth and other Jewish holidays, explaining that “every
Jewish holiday is important” and saying that he did not understand the nature
of the question.92 The exchanges in these instances suffer because the condo
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid at 344 [translated by author].
Ibid at 286 [translated by author].
Fonfeder Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 211.
Ibid.
Amselem Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 300 [translated by author]. The litigant
reiterated his view several times that “il n’y a pas de symbolisme dans le judaïsme” (ibid at
302-303).
92. Klein Cross-examination, supra note 78 at 236-37.
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board’s counsel attempted to impose categories from the state legal culture’s
understanding of religion onto the litigants’ religious practices.
Once the matter moved to the courts, the litigants’ counsel generally spoke
from within state legal frameworks. Counsel explained the litigants’ claims in the
language of legislation, contracts, property, and other categories familiar to the
courts. There were moments, however, when counsel attempted to speak from
the religious practitioners’ perspectives to make their particular religious practices
comprehensible. As counsel for B’nai Brith Canada put it to the Court,
if you’re celebrating Soukot with my family, that’s perfectly acceptable under Jewish law, but if it’s a hardship ... if it becomes a “corvée exceptionnelle” for you to
celebrate Soukot with my family, with my kids yelling in the succah and perhaps
another five families, then you are not only supposed to, but you are forbidden
under Jewish law to celebrate Soukot in that fashion.93

Interestingly, the lawyer who made these representations soon drew an
analogy to another religious faith to illustrate his argument about religious
freedom: “[The Charter] does not protect—to use a Catholic idea, it does not
protect exclusively the Pope’s version ... of what a Catholic obligation is.”94 Here,
the cross-cultural communication is quite rich, as counsel sought to make his
argument more accessible by referencing a religious tradition that may have been
more familiar to judges. Of course, the judges would eventually have to translate
whatever understandings they reached into the terms of Canadian constitutional
culture. Nonetheless, the reference to Catholicism might have helped judges with
a Catholic or other Christian background understand what was at stake for the
Jewish claimants.
Other instances of cross-cultural communication within the adversarial
process can be seen in the involvement of rabbis under the legal category of
“expert witnesses.” Opposing counsel’s adoption of overly simplistic accounts of
Jewish rituals resulted in communicative failures in some of these exchanges.
For instance, after one rabbi opined that an observant Jew should not buy an
apartment with a covered balcony because he would not be able to build a
succah, counsel for the condo board countered that another rabbi lived in the
condominium complex in just such a situation.95 Counsel here implied that the
93. Amselem, supra note 1 (Oral Argument, Steven Slimovitch on behalf of B’nai Brith Canada at
23).
94. Ibid.
95. Amselem, supra note 1 (Cross-examination of Moïse Ohana, 17 March 1998, Appellant’s
Record, vol 2 at 282). In interviews, a litigant called this person a “self-proclaimed rabbi.”
Interview of Litigant 2 [nd] [translated by author].

KISLOWICZ, FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS? 167

rabbi serving as an expert witness adopted an unusual interpretation of the succah
obligation. Applying a converse tactic, counsel for B’nai Brith Canada asked a
question to the condo board’s expert witness that emphasized the differences
between Sephardic and Ashkenazi observances of Succoth.96 To this question, the
condo board’s rabbi replied: “There are frequently minor differences ... I think
that what we’re talking about is basically applicable in both communities.”97
Both of these lines of questioning demonstrate an oversimplification of practices
within the Jewish community. The first line of questioning glosses over the
internal diversity of Jewish practice, while the second overstates the differences in
succah practices between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews. Perhaps unconsciously,
these reductionist accounts represent both a lack of respect and a lack of
self-awareness. In a more ideal form of cross-cultural communication, counsel
would have reflected on their own cultures and realized that such easy narratives
fail to capture most lived cultural experiences.
The Court’s position on expert testimony in religious freedom cases may
limit opportunities for cross-cultural dialogue. In Amselem, the Court held that
expert testimony was relevant to determine only the credibility of a religious
freedom claimant rather than the objective validity of a religious practice.98 This
has had the effect of curtailing the involvement of expert witnesses in religious
freedom cases. The expert testimony in Amselem went into a significant amount
of detail regarding Jewish law, allowing the court (potential) entry into various
views from inside Jewish culture. In contrast, there was a brief expert witness
report in Multani, but no cross-examination or oral testimony; in Wilson Colony,
there was no expert testimony. While the Court’s ruling in Amselem allows courts
a way to avoid a dispute regarding religious doctrine, it has also impoverished the
opportunity for cross-cultural dialogue in litigation. On balance, I agree with the
Court’s choice in Amselem but it is nevertheless worthwhile to reflect on its costs.
2.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

In some instances, counsel experienced difficulty in explaining religious practices
to the bench. One lawyer explained:
especially in the Superior Court, you got the impression that the judge was saying,
“Look ... is there not a rule book? Give me the damn rule book.” ... That was the
impression you got ... it permeated everything, and we tried to explain to him, no
96. Amselem, supra note 1 (Cross Examination of Barry Levy, 17 March 1998, Appellant’s
Record, vol 2 at 306).
97. Ibid at 306-307.
98. See Amselem, supra note 1 at para 54.
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sir, there is no rule book ... yes, there are hierarchy [sic] of rules, but ... there is no
hierarchy of rule-making, or rule-deciding... . So we don’t have the same system, so
what do you do?99

At trial, much of the decision turned on the issue of which side could
present the more coherent account of the succah and its laws measured against the
standard of rationality. I suggest that the trial judge’s effort to come to terms with
Jewish law was an unsuccessful moment of cross-cultural communication. In his
encounter with a religious legal culture, he used his position of power to define
the objective limits of the succah practice, concluding that the installation of a
succah on one’s own property is an optional practice in Judaism.100 By imagining
that such an objective limit exists, the trial judge neglects the fluidity of cultural
practices within religious groups and, I believe, shows insufficient respect for
and openness to the religious claimants’ perspectives. The decision therefore does
not embody the values of successful cross-cultural communication. The risk that
deeper engagement with an unfamiliar culture could lead courts into making this
kind of pronouncement might be the reason that the Court preferred the thinner
dialogue described above.
But what does the Court’s majority decision in Amselem mean for crosscultural communication? Berger argues that the Court adopted a variant of
liberalism’s relative indifference. In his view, it was only because the Court was
able to understand the succah practice as a matter of individual preference that
it did not seek to prevent the Amselem claimants from erecting their succoth.101
It would be troubling, from the perspective of cross-cultural communication,
to imagine that the Court applied this individualist paradigm to the succah
without engaging the claimants’ perspectives. In several instances, however, it
was counsel for the succah-builders who advocated an individualist response to
religious freedom: “freedom of conscience is as important as freedom of religion
and conscience by its nature, it comes before religion, and by its nature, can only
be individual.”102 Further, counsel for the intervener, B’nai Brith Canada, specifically advocated an approach of indifference:
it’s simply inappropriate for Courts to get involved in deciding on what religions
dictate and that all the judges below were wrong in saying ... this is what the Jewish religion requires, that when there’s a matter of religious controversy, the Courts

99.
100.
101.
102.

Interview of Lawyer 1 [nd].
Syndicat Northcrest c Amselem, [1998] RJQ 1892 at paras 98-101, [1998] RDI 489.
Berger, “Cultural Limits,” supra note 21 at 265-266.
Amselem, supra note 1 (Oral Argument, Julius Grey on behalf of the Appellants at 2).
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should, if at all possible, avoid the controversy and deal with other issues if they can
do so.103

Accordingly, it would be too simplistic to posit that the litigants and their
counsel put forward a version of their religion that the Court misinterpreted, or
that the Court’s application of concepts from the state legal culture was done
entirely at the judges’ own motion. The arguments put forward by counsel make
clear that there were other factors at work. The cultural, personal, and educational
backgrounds of counsel, as well as the prior commitments of the existing case
law, stand out as likely candidates.
In the final analysis, however, Berger’s argument is persuasive. The Court
made sense of the succah practice in liberalism’s individualistic terms, relying in
part on counsel’s arguments to come to this conclusion. The Court cared less
about what the practice meant to the practitioners and more about the fact that
the practice mattered to them at all. Cross-cultural communication in Amselem
is deliberately thin and remains unconcerned about the nuances of religious
experience. While this does leave some “real liberty” for religious practitioners,104
it is disconcerting that success depends in part on framing a religious practice as
consistent with a liberal ethos.
3.

LITIGANT REFLECTIONS

In contrast to some of the reflections from counsel involved in the case, the
Amselem litigant I interviewed did not remark on the same communication
problems with respect to the courts. Indeed, the litigant remarked: “all of the
judges who rendered judgments in this case were right.”105 The thirteen judges106
who heard this case at its various stages of appeal produced six separate opinions,
some disagreeing in the final disposition and all demonstrating variations in
reasoning. In saying that all were correct, the litigant may have been exaggerating
to make a point. Alternatively, he can be taken as demonstrating a remarkable
tolerance of ambiguity.
In internalizing the judgments, the litigant put them into his own culturally
familiar terms: “when we read the judgment, it was a course in Talmud, a course
in Gemarrah, it’s extraordinary the way that one says yes, the other [says no], I
find the justice in this country magnificent. People are well informed, and bravo!
103.
104.
105.
106.

Amselem, supra note 1 (Oral Argument, David Matas on behalf of B’nai Brith Canada at 16).
Berger, “Cultural Limits,” supra note 21 at 266.
Interview of Litigant 2 [nd].
If the judge presiding over the interim injunction is included, the total count is fourteen
judges.
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... One must be proud of this.”107 This framing of the judgments reiterates the
necessary translation that individuals perform on texts in order to ascribe them
meaning.108 It is likely that this positive attitude was influenced significantly by
the litigant’s ultimate success in the case. However, it would have been open to
the litigant to express some negative feelings towards the judgments that went
against him, and he did not. In his narrative, these sentiments were reserved for
the condo board of co-owners.
B. MULTANI

Whereas the dispute in Amselem focused on the existence of a particular religious
obligation, the communicative difficulties faced by the Multani litigants related
principally to the characterization of the kirpan as a weapon. This difficulty was
experienced from the moment that the school principal became aware of the
kirpan:
the principal came up to me ... she called me out of the class ... and she started asking me if I have a knife on me. I was like, I don’t have any knife ... and she was like
you have weapon or a knife on you? No I don’t. She’s like, you have something under
your clothes? I’m like, yeah, I have kirpan.109

Following this exchange, the litigant described an earnest attempt to engage
in dialogue: “in the beginning ... we tried our best to keep our article of faith
and see what people’s opinion too. Like, we tried to make a best compromise,
it has to be tightened enough ... like obviously it’s always under my clothes,
nobody can see it.”110 This initial dialogue proved fruitful, as the principal and the
family reached an agreement that the kirpan would be secured in a particular way.
As the issue escalated, however, the litigant described how his family’s attempts
at dialogue were rebuffed. The school officials began by proposing options that
he found unacceptable: “they were proposing ... you should wear the wooden
kirpan, or you should be wearing plastic kirpan, you should wear it in your neck
or something like that, very small ... if we accept that, then I’m giving up ... [the]
whole thing.”111 In his narrative, he was left with no choice but to hire a lawyer
and take the matter to court.
107. Interview of Litigant 2[nd] [translated by author].
108. See Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative” in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat,
eds, Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1992) 95.
109. Interview of Litigant 1 [nd].
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
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Then we didn’t have any choice, we contact the local gurudwara committee ... we believe we can solve things by talking, right, dialogue? So, they tried to talk to school ...
they still didn’t agree, they kept saying security issues, so we didn’t have any choice,
we met one of the lawyers.112

4.

ADVERSARIAL DIALOGUES

Communication problems continued after the Multani litigants retained counsel.
In one litigant’s recollection, school officials were dismissive of his family’s
concerns:
And then, I think, [our lawyer] set up a meeting with the school board... . We sat
together, we tried to talk to them, they didn’t listen, there were parents, there were
schools, at school board there were about 20 to 30 members... . So we were there
explaining them, but they kept laughing, and they just didn’t listen to us.113

Though the school officials certainly may have different recollections, this
participant’s narrative indicates a lack of basic measures being taken to ensure
that participants felt that they were respected and that their concerns were taken
seriously.
When the matter came to court, the Multanis’ counsel and the expert witness
they put forward emphasized that the kirpan was not a weapon and framed the
kirpan in terms of the values it represented.114 For example, expert witness Manjit
Singh explained: “The Kirpan is not a ‘knife’ or ‘dagger’; it is quite blunt and it
comes from the word ‘Kirpa’ meaning mercy and kindness and ‘aan’ meaning
honour.”115 Moreover, in an apparent effort to bridge the cultural gap, Manjit
Singh affirmed that, in the Sikh tradition, “any resistance to evil must be pacific
until all means have failed and that all people must be tolerated and treated well.
In this way, Sikhism is very similar to Christianity or Judaism.”116
The oral arguments put forth by the Multanis’ counsel contained similar
themes. In his narrative of the emergence of the Sikh religion, he emphasized the
values Sikhism shares with Canadian constitutional culture. According to counsel,
Sikhism began as a revolt against the caste system and the unequal treatment

112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. See Valerie Stoker, “Zero Tolerance? Sikh Swords, School Safety, and Secularism in Québec”
(2007) 75:4 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 814.
115. Multani, supra note 2 (Affidavit of Manjit Singh, 25 March 2002, Application for Leave to
Appeal, vol 1 at 61).
116. Ibid.
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of women, and was in favour of individual autonomy and free expression.117
Moreover, Sikhs are in favour of integration rather than separation.118 These
shared values had little legal relevance to the dispute, but arguably this framing
helped to translate the Multanis’ perspective, making it intelligible to the courts.
Interestingly, counsel for the Multanis also held up dialogue itself as a virtue.
He criticized the school’s governing body for not attempting to have a dialogue
with Sikh students. Counsel focused on the affidavit of Robert Brousseau, a
former police officer who worked in the school and affirmed the large potential
for violence in the school. The Multanis’ counsel noted that Brousseau had not
attempted to speak with Sikh students before reaching this conclusion.119 In
other words, the Multanis’ counsel characterized the school officials’ behaviour,
in part, as a failure of cross-cultural communication.
In addition, it was significant that the lawyer who represented the intervening
World Sikh Organization (WSO) was personally familiar with the Sikh religion
and culture. According to a litigant, counsel for the WSO often served as an
intermediary between the litigants and their own lawyer.120 Counsel for the WSO
noted that her common ground with both the litigants and their counsel helped
make the litigants more comfortable with her. This also aided in the development
of the legal case:
certainly it was easier for [the litigant] to speak to me in those days. He was a fairly
recent immigrant to Canada and his family too, I speak the language and ... [the
litigant’s counsel] and I had a close enough relationship that we understood that …
we were both on the same side and we trusted each other’s instincts... . I could guide
[the litigant’s counsel] and direct him, or where there were holes that he needed I
would help him or ... where there were things that ... he thought I was missing we
would talk about those.121

Counsel for the intervener also explained how she was able to draw
connections between the values underlying the kirpan practice and Canadian
constitutional culture:
if you hear about all those ideals [associated with the kirpan], they’re very consistent
with Charter values ... with Canadian values ... defending the defenseless, that’s what
117. Multani, supra note 2 (Oral Argument, Julius Grey on behalf of Multani before Sup Ct at 10,
Appellant’s Record before SCC, vol 2 at 257) [Grey Oral Argument].
118. Ibid at 262.
119. Ibid at 297-98). See also Multani, supra note 2 (Oral Argument, Julius Grey on behalf of
Multani before Sup Ct at 141, Respondent’s Record before SCC at 143).
120. Interview of Litigant 1 [nd]. The litigant also noted that this served to help limit the legal
fees payable to his own counsel.
121. Interview of Lawyer 3 [nd].
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the Charter is all about, really right? To protect the minority against the tyranny of
the majority. And so that was a large part of our educational process with the court,
was to really be able to speak about what these articles of faith mean for the larger
Sikh community, and why they’re so important ... why it’s difficult and challenging
for a Sikh to be parted from those and why that literally impacts on my conscience...
.122

Borrowing from Newman and Taylor’s terminology discussed in Part II(A)
(2), above, the WSO’s effort at cross-cultural communication emphasized that
what may have appeared to be a concept-based difference regarding the classification of the kirpan was actually a category mistake made by the school officials.
Following their argument, the shared values between the two cultures should lead
to the adoption of a legal form that would allow students to wear their kirpans.
5.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of efforts to bridge the cultural gaps between
Sikh culture and the state legal culture at the trial level. The ruling from Justice
Grenier is short and contains only the terms of an apparent settlement between
the parties.123 However, in one exchange between the trial judge and counsel,
it is possible to detect the court’s impatience with the perceived ambiguities in
Sikhism. When counsel for the Multanis displayed ambivalence about whether
keeping the kirpan in a leather sheath would be acceptable to his clients, Justice
Grenier sought a stable answer as to what the religion prescribed, irrespective of the Multanis’ personal position.124 Counsel did not attempt to resolve
this ambiguity. Indeed, in his previous submissions, he had made reference to
variation in practice within the Sikh community,125 and he had also argued that
religious beliefs were not subject to rational scrutiny.126 In responding to this
particular question, counsel merely asked for time to confer with his clients.127 In
this instance counsel could not bridge the gap between his clients’ views and the
court’s desire for a rationalized version of the Sikh religion.

122. Ibid.
123. The Council of Commissioners nonetheless appealed, arguing that it had never actually
agreed to the accommodation contained in the judgment.
124. Multani, supra note 2 (Oral Argument, Question from Grenier J to Julius Grey on behalf of
Multani before Sup Ct at 130, Appellant’s Record before SCC, vol 2 at 377).
125. Grey Oral Argument, supra note 117 at 263.
126. Ibid at 375. For an argument that religious practice is marked by an irreducible, non-rational
core, see Avihay Dorfman, “Freedom of Religion” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & Jur 279.
127. Grey Oral Argument, supra note 117 at 381.

174

(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

In another exchange, Justice Grenier showed that she was not prepared to
accept the assertion that the kirpan was not a weapon: “perhaps for your clients a
kirpan is not a knife, but it is primarily a knife.”128 Nevertheless, Justice Grenier
encouraged the parties to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution,129 withdrawing
herself from the dialogue to some degree and inviting the parties to dialogue
directly with each other.
The Court of Appeal’s reaction was quite different. While the language of the
opinion is generally respectful, and the court acknowledges the sincere religious
beliefs of the Multanis,130 it rejected the proposition that a kirpan is not a weapon.
The majority remarked that the kirpan, “[s]tripped of its symbolic religious
significance ... has all of the physical characteristics of an edged weapon.”131 This
stripping of context is exemplary of a failed cross-cultural communication. By
positing a single, objective characterization of the kirpan, the decision rests on the
assumption that the court’s perception of the kirpan is without or above culture,
demonstrating a lack of self-awareness.
At the Supreme Court, the Multani litigants were able to make themselves
understood in important ways. In large measure, this was attributable to the
ability of counsel to assist the Court in maintaining self-awareness. This was
achieved mainly by comparing the kirpan to other potentially dangerous objects
that were not excluded from schools. For example, in his submissions to the
Court, counsel for the Multani family asked rhetorically why the Court should
not accommodate a kirpan “when many more dangerous objects are present
in the schools ... : a compass, a baseball bat, gym equipment, lab equipment
which may be used to set fires, an automobile which is used for excursions.”132
Justice Bastarache challenged this proposition, suggesting that the reason people
opposed accommodating the kirpan was “because a kirpan is a dagger and a
dagger is an arm.”133 Counsel responded by reiterating the culturally contingent
attitudes towards sharp objects:
128. Multani, supra note 2 (Oral Argument, Question from Grenier J to Julius Grey on behalf
of Multani before Sup Ct at 131, Respondent’s Record before SCC at 133) [translated by
author].
129. Grey Oral Argument, supra note 117 at 381; Interview of Lawyer 2 [nd].
130. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys v Singh Multani, [2004] RJQ 824 at para 70, 241,
DLR (4th) 336 (Que CA).
131. Ibid at para 89.
132. Grey Oral Argument, supra note 117 at 311, 313. At trial, counsel also drew analogies
between the integration of juvenile offenders and HIV-positive students into public schools
even where such integration presented a risk. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
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A kirpan is as much a dagger as a compass. A compass is a sharp object. It’s in the
shape of a dagger ... A kirpan is not an arm, it’s been held over and over again ... It
isn’t intended to be a weapon, it isn’t a weapon, it’s a symbol of a weapon.134

Later, the Multanis’ counsel again used analogies as a means of cross-cultural
communication. Counsel described the kirpan as symbolizing resistance to
oppression, drawing links to cultural artefacts with which judges of the Court
would be familiar, such as the lyrics to O Canada and La Marseillaise.135 Further,
echoing an argument advanced in Amselem,136 the Multanis’ counsel analogized
the kirpan to other forms of religious expression more likely to be known to the
judges:
The idea that Quebec students cannot be taught the difference between a kippa
and an illegal hat or a baseball hat worn by students, that they cannot be taught the
difference between a kirpan and a knife, that they can’t be taught the difference between a scarf worn by a Muslim girl and an illegal violation of the school uniform is
terrible and it’s very close to the views now discredited that if [a police officer] wore
a turban then, somehow, Canadians would not have respect for him.137

6.

PARTICIPANT REFLECTIONS

In the end, the Court was careful not to label the kirpan as a weapon, instead
describing it as “a religious object that resembles a dagger and must be made of
metal.”138 For the Multani litigants, the Court functioned as a translator to the
general public: “Before ... media was kind of against us too, they always calling it
knife or weapon or dagger, but right after once we won the case [in the Supreme
Court] they started calling it kirpan, specifically kirpan in the newspapers, media
and everywhere.”139
Perhaps because of his eventual success, the litigant was able to frame the
longer narrative in similarly positive terms, including cross-cultural encounters
he experienced after the decision:
I went to few shops… and they’ve been seeing us on TV, right? They see us, they
react, they give us a bad look and stuff, but they do come up to us and ask, oh, you’re
the same guy, oh you know, you shouldn’t do that, you’re in the community like this,

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Ibid.
Ibid at 22-23.
See section Part IV(A)(1), above.
Grey Oral Argument, supra note 117 at 11.
Multani, supra note 2 at para 3.
Interview of Litigant 1 [nd].
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you’re supposed to live the way they live, we explained them, and then we find that
their point of view against the kirpan is changed right after we tell them.140

Likewise, in responding to the ruling, one of the lawyers involved expressed
relief and satisfaction at the result and optimism for future cases. Her narrative
expressed her hope, before the Supreme Court hearing, that she would be
understood, and her delight afterwards at feeling that she had been:
You just say, I don’t know what the outcome’s going to be. I know what it should be,
but I just don’t know whether what I am articulating will be understood by them
... What I was blown away by when I read that judgment was that they really got it
... some of the most profoundly beautiful statements on freedom of belief and conscience came from those eight judges. I mean, to me it’s a decision that all Canadians
ought to read just for that reason alone, because of their intuitive understanding of
what conscience was and what it meant, and what it meant to live in this multicultural society. ...
I thought they did it, and we were profoundly grateful that we lived in a country
where we could make such arguments and have such depth of understanding with
judges who ... [are] not necessarily living with Joe Average and all that but who
understood what Joga Singh Average was thinking and feeling.141

Therefore, the Court demonstrated to participants that it could communicate
across a significant cultural divide by taking into account the particular perspective
of the Multani claimants. On the other hand, both Benjamin Berger and Lori
Beaman have suggested that the Court’s decision in Multani may not represent
a large success in terms of cross-cultural communication. Berger argues that the
Multani litigants were only successful because the Court was able to filter their
religious practice through an individualist lens,142 while Beaman underlines the
Court’s separation of belief and practice.143 Even so, the participant narratives
explored here demonstrate that the primary communicative aim of the litigants
and the intervening WSO was that the kirpan not be categorized as a weapon.
Given that the Court of Appeal treated the kirpan as a weapon, it is important
to recognize that the Court’s view was far from a foregone conclusion when the
matter was litigated. Accordingly, the Court’s description of the kirpan can be
viewed as a significant moment in cross-cultural communication.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Ibid.
Interview of Lawyer 3 [nd].
Berger, “Cultural Limits,” supra note 21 at 260.
Beaman, supra note 41 at 283.
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C. WILSON COLONY

In Wilson Colony, a group of Hutterian Brethren challenged a provincial regulation
that made driver’s licence photos universally mandatory.144 For some twenty-seven
years, the province had maintained a religious exemption to this requirement.
Some Hutterites, including the Wilson Colony members, believe that the biblical
Second Commandment prohibiting graven images applies to all imagery. On
this basis, they refrain from taking photographs or being photographed. They
had long availed themselves of the religious exemption to photography, allowing
Colony members to conduct all aspects of the Colony’s agribusiness—an instantiation of their collectivist worldview.
Of the three cases under review, Wilson Colony represents the most challenging
instance of cross-cultural communication. While the biblical scriptures on which
the Hutterite faith is based are likely familiar to many members of the Canadian
judiciary, differences between Hutterite and mainstream Christian interpretations of scripture set the Hutterites apart. Their religious worldview leads Colony
members to live in purposeful isolation and their collectivist lifestyle is expressed
in communal property ownership, 145 accomplished through the legal form of
the corporation.146 Though land ownership was not at issue here, Hutterite
collectivism was. In my view it was not given full respect by the majority of the
Court. Before addressing judicial responses, however, I examine the dialogue that
occurred between the Wilson Colony and the government of Alberta.
7.

ADVERSARIAL DIALOGUES

A first challenge for the Wilson Colony’s counsel was to locate an appropriate
source text. This was literally a problem of translation, as the Hutterites use
German language biblical texts for prayer and study. It was crucial, according
144. See Wilson Colony, supra note 3.
145. This unusual pattern of property ownership has emphasized the difference in the Hutterite’s
worldview and led to some disputes with neighbouring landowners. A publication from the
1960s included in the litigation documents is a remnant from such a dispute. See Wilson
Colony, supra note 3 (Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, Affirmed 10 August 2005,
Appellant’s Record, vol 2 at 204). This publication advocated against regulations that would
have required Hutterite colonies to observe minimum distance requirements between
colonies. See also Walter v Alberta (Attorney General), [1969] SCR 383, 3 DLR (3d) 1 (where
a Hutterite community unsuccessfully challenged provincial regulations restricting its ability
to purchase land).
146. For a case holding that Hutterite colony members can be validly excluded from the colony
without compensation, see Hofer et al v Hofer et al, [1970] SCR 958, 13 DLR (3d) 1. See
also Howard Kislowicz, “Judging the Rules of Belonging” (2011) 44:2 UBC L Rev 287.
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to counsel, to find an English version that accurately reflected the content of the
German text:
I’m not an expert in the Bible, but there are various versions and various interpretations and that was a matter that required a fair amount of review and ensuring ...
that I understood what their interpretation was and which edition… it was that they
followed. Of course they had the German one, but it is roughly translated out by the
King James version ... the difference between the King James [version] of the Second
Commandment and some of the other versions ... was fairly critical.147

The affidavits display efforts to explain the Colony’s religious beliefs
and practices to the courts. Notably, before dealing with the prohibition on
photographs, one litigant’s affidavit described the communal nature of the
Colony:
I am a member in good standing of the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,
which is a religious communal organization... . Property, lands and chattels are held
collectively by the religious organization with individuals relinquishing the rights of
ownership in favour of the benefits of membership.148

In a later affidavit, the litigant explained further:
The failure or inability of any member to carry out their responsibilities causes our
religious commune to function improperly, thereby eroding the fabric of our social,
cultural and religious way of life. Although not every failure or inability to perform
results in a serious erosion of this fabric, the incremental damage to date resulting
from the position of the [Alberta government] is significant.149

The affidavit goes on to explain the economic and practical impacts of the
universal photo policy on the Colony, claiming it would affect the operation
of the Colony’s agribusiness and ability to drive members to medical appoint-

147. Interview of Lawyer 4 [nd]. This issue also arose in cross-examination. The Wilson Colony
materials also included a translated passage from the Wisdom of Solomon, a book not
included in all versions of the King James translation. The government’s counsel could not
find the Wisdom of Solomon in the English King James translation. The litigant explained,
“We really don’t use much of the English versions … But in our German Bible there is the
Wisdom of Solomon in there.” Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Cross-Examination of Samuel
Wurz, 2 February 2006, Appellant’s Record, vol 5 at 684) [Wurz Cross-examination]. In
other words, from the outset, the Hutterites had to work with translated versions of their
religious source texts in order to make their religion intelligible to the state.
148. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, 10 August 2005, Appellant’s Record
at 191) [Wurz Affidavit, 10 August 2005].
149. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, 10 November 2005, Appellant’s
Record at 215).
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ments. In addition, one of the exhibits to the affidavit provides a more detailed
description of the religious import of communal living to the Hutterites:
the idea of love–brotherly togetherness and sharing ... was at the very center of Jacob
Hutter’s [the founding figure of the group for whom it is named] work. He visualized the brotherhood as a great family. Since in such a family all material things are
shared as a matter of fact, this should also be the case in a true Gemeinschaft, or community... . Private property is the greatest enemy of Christian Love.150

The affidavit then explains the specific prohibition on photography with
direct reference to biblical text:
the Hutterian Brethren believe that Commandment No. 2 of The Ten Commandments prohibits the capture of one’s image ... [and] allowing their photographs to
be taken willingly ... would be a sin. Commandment No. 2 states, “You shall not
make for yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth
beneath or in the water under the earth”, which the Hutterian Brethren interpret to
include photographs capturing their likeness.151

The litigant also noted that at one point, some Colony members had
driver’s licences with photographs, an apparent inconsistency in the Wilson
Colony’s religious practice. The litigant stated that he was “shocked to learn”
of this.152 He explained that these members were to be punished in accordance
with the Colony’s traditions. In offering this explanation, the litigant integrates
the apparent inconsistency into a narrative of imperfect faith, with themes of
obligation, sin, repentance, and punishment. Though the style of discipline may
be unfamiliar to state actors, the narrative helps to affirm the Wilson Colony’s
particular interpretation of the Second Commandment, even in the face of facts
that would seem to contradict it.153
In addition to framing Hutterite practices in these terms, the affidavit also
relies on authoritative state documents by making reference to the preamble of

150. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Robert Friedmann, The Christian Communism of the Hutterite
Brethren, Exhibit “A” to the Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, 10 August 2005, Appellant’s Record at
200-201).
151. Wurz Affidavit, 10 August 2005, supra note 148 at 192.
152. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, 18 January 2006, Appellant’s Record
at 303).
153. Similarly, when opposing counsel brought up the fact that images could be found in other
Hutterite colonies, the litigant characterized this as a lapse in faith. He said, “[S]ometimes we
get lax, we don’t believe, and that’s where these images come from.” Wilson Colony, supra note
3 (Cross-Examination of Samuel Wurz, 2 February 2006, Appellant’s Record, vol 5 at 694).
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,154 which recognizes the supremacy
of God.155 One might surmise that this paragraph was drafted in conjunction
with legal counsel. This leads to a claim more intelligible to a state court,
especially when contrasted with an earlier letter drafted by a group of Hutterites
that relied principally on biblical verses to construct an argument against the
universal photo requirement.156
Despite these efforts to make the Hutterite claim comprehensible, the
transcript of the cross-examination on this affidavit reveals several cross-cultural
communication difficulties between a Colony member and the Alberta government’s lawyer. The government’s counsel began by drawing a distinction between
participating in the creation of an image and having images in one’s daily life.157
He then applied this distinction to the driver’s licence context:
Would you agree with me that the images that we have to create at the Ministry of
Government Services to conduct our security process wouldn’t become part of your
daily life ... and that ... having a license with your photo on it ... would not contradict that aspect of your concerns about idolatry and images?158

The Hutterite witness resisted these analytical categories, saying: “[I]f
you contradict one Commandment you are trespassing [on] the rest of the
Commandments.”159 Counsel pursued the notion further, and was met by the
same resistance:
Q: it seems to me ... you have more than one concern with images. One part of your
concern is participating in their creation and another part of your concern is having
it direct your mind possibly to value things other than God. And I thought that
those – there was a reasonable distinction to be drawn between those two things.
Fair enough? ...
A: No. ... We do not believe in pictures and there’s no use arguing over trying to find
an alternative if there is an image or a picture involved.160

The reason that counsel pushed on with this distinction was to lay
the foundation for an argument that the government had done its best to
154. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11.
155. Wurz Affidavit, 10 August 2005, supra note 148 at 193.
156. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Exhibit F to the Affidavit of Samuel Wurz, 10 August 2005,
Appellant’s Record at 207).
157. Wurz Cross-examination, supra note 147 at 670
158. Ibid at 674.
159. Ibid at 675, 681-84.
160. Ibid at 679, 681.
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accommodate the Wilson Colony members. By separating out two aspects of
Hutterite belief, the government could claim that it met the Wilson Colony
halfway by taking one aspect of the belief into account. The problem is that the
analytical breakdown of the religious belief was put forward by the government’s
counsel and never accepted by the religious adherents. Indeed, the distinction
seemed unintelligible to the litigant. When counsel asked whether it was fair to
characterize the government’s proposal as meeting “some of your concerns but ...
nonetheless, insufficient,” the litigant simply did not understand, replying: “Can
I beg your pardon on that? I quite don’t follow you there.”161
In argument before the Court, counsel for the Alberta government did
demonstrate an understanding of the Hutterite’s objection to being photographed:
“[The photo requirement] is inconsistent with a certain branch of Hutterian
beliefs, certainly Wilson Colony’s, the respondents’, who believe that the making
of the image involves them in the creation of [a] graven image, contrary to the
Second Commandment.”162 At other points in the argument, counsel attempted
to discredit the evidence of the Wilson Colony members who claimed that having
driver’s licences was essential for their community’s survival. Counsel analogized
the Wilson Colony Hutterites to Amish communities, overstating the similarities
between the two Anabaptist groups:
their evidence is, although we discount it, that having drivers’ licences is essentially
for the continued existence of their agricultural communal communities ... [W]e
believe that the consequence of requiring a driver’s licence would be that the respondents would, as others would, prioritize their travel and hire someone to drive them,
much as Amish do.163

As discussed below, this prediction turned out to be erroneous, arguably in
part because it failed to appreciate the internal diversity of Anabaptist practice.
When counsel for the Wilson Colony appeared at the Court, he spent nearly
the entirety of his oral argument engaged in a fairly semantic exchange with
members of the Court regarding the nature of reasonable accommodation and
the application of section 1 of the Charter (the “reasonable limits” provision).164
This is attributable, in large measure, to the fact that the infringement of religious
freedom was conceded by the Alberta government. But it also highlights the
161. Ibid at 690.
162. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Oral Argument, Rod Wiltshire on behalf of Alberta at 2).
163. Ibid at 13. This echoes the technique applied by counsel for the condo board in the Amselem
litigation, discussed in Part IV(A)(1), above.
164. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Oral Argument, K Gregory Senda on behalf of Wilson Colony
at 46-75).
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degree to which the terms of discussion are set by concepts embedded in the
state’s legal culture.
Indeed, counsel for the Wilson Colony also spent a significant portion of his
written submissions pursuing the argument that fundamental freedoms should
not be infringed without debate in the legislature. In this view, the abolition of
the religious exemption to the driver’s licence photo requirement was invalid
because the executive implemented it by regulation without legislative debate.165
The Court rejected this argument. That counsel would spend so much time on
this point when his clients find engagement in the democratic process problematic
(for example, they do not vote)166 suggests that counsel felt compelled to pursue
an argument that would have made little sense to their clients.167
Interestingly, counsel for two of the intervener organizations—the Evangelical
Fellowship of Canada and the Christian Legal Fellowship168—opened a line of
dialogue calling into question the Court’s individualist approach to religion.
Counsel asked “the court to recognize that there is a communal component of
the freedom of religion; that the freedom of religion in large part manifested as a
group or part of a group.”169 Such a discussion centres on a value-based difference
that has implications for the legal form accorded to the norm of religious
freedom. While the constitutional culture and the religious cultures represented
in the Wilson Colony litigation agreed that religious freedom was an important
norm, the precise legal form of that norm depends crucially on the values that
underlie it. In the Court’s articulation, those values share liberalism’s concern for
the individual, even though counsel for the interveners sought to introduce the
value of community into this discussion. Notably, in an attempt to bridge the
cultural divide, counsel for the intervener organizations grounded this argument
in constitutional provisions and previous statements of the Court rather than in
a religious text or artefact.

165. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Factum of the Respondent at 14-18).
166. Interview of Litigant 4 [nd].
167. This may be explained, in part, by the holding of the Alberta Court of Appeal, which
gestured in this direction. See Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160
at paras 27-28, 417 AR 68 [Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony].
168. According to an interview participant, these organizations did not make contact with the
Hutterian Brethren before making their submissions (interview of Litigant 4 [nd]).
169. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 (Oral Argument, Charles Gibson on behalf of the Evangelical
Fellowship of Canada and the Christian Legal Fellowship at 88).

KISLOWICZ, FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS? 183

8.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

The Court of Queen’s Bench was attentive to the Wilson Colony’s concern with
being photographed. Justice Lovecchio noted two accommodations proposed by
the province. The first was that photos would continue to be taken, stored in the
electronic database, and included on a driver’s licence, but the licence would be
issued in an enclosure identifying it as the property of the Province of Alberta
which would only need to be offered to a peace officer as necessary. The second
proposal was that the photo be taken and stored in the electronic database, but
not included on the individual’s licence.170 Justice Lovecchio was not impressed
with these proposals, as “under either accommodation, members of the applicant
colony who wish to drive will have to submit to having their photograph taken
which is precisely their problem.”171 At the same time, however, he offered only
an abbreviated discussion in his decision of the Hutterites’ communalism.172
Perhaps the court felt it did not need to engage in this kind of discussion in order
to grant the Wilson Colony the remedy it sought.
In addition, showing self-awareness, the Court of Queen’s Bench was
sceptical of the government’s description of the legislation’s objective. While
courts frequently adopt such a posture, and being sceptical of a government
argument is not equivalent to writing decisions that demonstrate reflection on
the law’s own prior assumptions, it is notable that even though both the courts
and the Alberta legislature speak the language of the state, the court thought it
important to scrutinize the government’s claims. This adds a gloss on Berger’s
insight that courts and litigants do not participate as equals in cross-cultural
encounters. Judicial review serves as a balancing mechanism, albeit an imperfect
one. To some extent, judges can decrease the likelihood that cross-cultural
encounters between citizens and the state will take the forms of conversion or
assimilation.
The majority of the Court of Appeal followed the Court of Queen’s Bench in
recognizing Hutterite religious beliefs and practices, and was similarly sceptical of
the government’s stated objectives. The majority also engaged more deeply with
the communalist worldview of the Wilson Colony, showing sensitivity to the
intertwined practical and religious consequences that a photo requirement would
have on this aspect of the Colony’s way of life:

170. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2006 ABQB 338 at paras 21-22, 398 AR 68.
171. Ibid at para 23.
172. Ibid at para 2.
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although the colonies attempt to be self-sufficient, certain members must drive
regularly on Alberta highways... .
Given their communal way of life, the inability to drive would ... have enumerable
and severe practical consequences for each individual in the respondents’ community ... the very existence of the community depends on each individual carrying out
the responsibilities assigned to him or her.173

In contrast, Justice Slatter’s dissenting judgment at the Court of Appeal
was less sceptical of the government’s position, pointing out that its evidence
on identity fraud was uncontradicted.174 Moreover, Justice Slatter supported
his decision by referring to other jurisdictions where photos are required on
driver’s licences and no exemption exists.175 In this way, Justice Slatter’s opinion
took comfort in views from the legal cultures of other liberal states which are
likely congruent in a broad sense with the court’s own cultural background. The
dissenting judgment’s largest failure of cross-cultural communication, however,
is the manner of its engagement with the Hutterite religious beliefs and practices.
In support of the conclusion that the accommodation offered by the government
was reasonable, Justice Slatter offered his own interpretation of the biblical texts
submitted by the Wilson Colony.
The central prohibition of the second commandment is the creation of idols... . The
proposed accommodations would preclude the respondents ever having to look at
their photographs themselves. While obviously not ideal from the perspective of the
respondents, the accommodations proposed by the appellant do have the effect of
significantly minimizing the impact of the regulations on the respondents’ observance of the second commandment.176

Though Justice Slatter purported to deal with the religious obligation “on
its own terms,”177 his analysis reveals that he actually approached it on the
government’s terms, disconnecting the biblical text from the Wilson Colony’s
interpretive tradition.
At the Court, the majority recognized both the photo-related and communalliving aspects of Hutterite religious practices. The effects of the photo requirement
on Hutterite communalism, however, were not considered as an infringement of
religious freedom, but as a factor to take into account in the proportionality
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, supra note 167 at paras 6, 54.
Ibid at paras 65-68.
Ibid at para 80.
Ibid at para 116.
Ibid at para 118.
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analysis.178 In this way, the majority failed to fully understand and respect the
religious dimensions of the Wilson Colony’s communalism. This demonstrates
that the Wilson Colony’s loss at the Court was about miscommunication in
addition to disagreement. Perhaps in part because of this communicative failure,
the majority did not properly anticipate the Colony’s reaction to its ruling.
The majority opined that the costs on the Colony would be financial—hiring
non-members to perform the necessary driving tasks for the Colony.179 However,
instead of contracting out driving services, some Colony members decided to
compromise their religious beliefs and have their photos taken, while others
chose to accept the penalties associated with driving with expired licences.180
Perhaps more worrisome for future cases is that the majority decision in
Wilson Colony sets up a legal scenario in which governments can refuse accommodation sought by a minority religious group if the accommodation would not
allow the government to completely reach its objective.181 This may discourage
dialogue between governments and religious groups. Under this approach, when
it comes to legislation, the government can simply articulate its purpose and
expect that, so long as the objective is legitimate, it will not need to compromise.
There may be political reasons for compromise, but this prospect is cold comfort
for minority populations with little political clout. In contrast, Justice LeBel’s
dissenting opinion held that courts should have more leeway “in determining
how far the goal ought to be attained in order to achieve the proper balance
between the objective of the state and the rights at stake.”182 This framework is
more likely to encourage dialogue between governments and minority religious
groups, as legislatures will expect judicial review to involve more scrutiny.
9.

LITIGANT REFLECTIONS

The litigants I interviewed attributed their loss at the Supreme Court to a failure of
communication. One litigant explained: “we figured we could explain everything
to our lawyer, and [he] explained everything to the judge in Ottawa, but it seems
178. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 at para 31. In contrast, Justice Abella’s dissenting opinion
emphasized the religious nature of both aspects of Hutterite belief and practice (ibid at para
118).
179. Ibid at para 97.
180. Interview of Litigant 3 [nd]; Interview of Litigant 4 [nd].
181. See Benjamin L Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Difference:
Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct
L Rev 25; Sara Weinrib, “An Exemption for Sincere Believers: The Challenge of Alberta v
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 719.
182. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 at para 196.
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like they didn’t really quite understand the way of life. And that’s why they made
that decision.”183 The same litigant also framed the communication breakdown
as a failure to recognize the Colony’s difference: “they figured we have to obey
the law, like all other people do.”184 In this perspective, to be treated “just like
everyone else” represents a failure to take into account the Hutterites’ religious
and cultural needs.185 In an alternative formulation provided by another litigant,
“it seems like we’re a nobody.”186 In other words, non-recognition of the Wilson
Colony’s particular attributes made the litigant feel as if he wasn’t recognized as
a full person.
At another point in the interview, a litigant explained that he was glad to
speak with journalists in order to explain his religion: “Any time we can explain
our religion,” he said, “we would gladly do that.”187 In other words, though the
Wilson Colony members prefer an isolated life in many respects, they are pleased
to engage with non-Hutterites in order to make their particular perspective
more widely understood. Significantly, however, this does not mean that Wilson
Colony members are open to back-and-forth engagement with other cultures.
Indeed, participants noted restrictions they observe to keep their members away
from the influence of popular culture. Televisions, radios, and Internet access, for
example, are forbidden on the Colony.188
Finally, one litigant also described some ongoing efforts to negotiate a
photo exemption directly with the government. Similarly to his explanation of
the Court’s decision, he attributed the failure to negotiate an exemption as a
communication problem:
We have written numerous letters to our MLAs, we had a couple of meetings with
the Minister of Government Services, we had a phone call with Premier Ed Stel183. Interview of Litigant 3 [nd].
184. Ibid. On the particular harm that may occur on such misrecognition, see Taylor,
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, supra note 45 at 25. Taylor writes,
“Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression,
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”
185. In the context of an analysis of the concept of relative difference, Martha Minow notes:
“Accommodation of religious practices may look nonneutral, but failure to accommodate
may also seem nonneutral by burdening the religious minority whose needs were not built
into the structure of mainstream institutions.” Martha Minow, Making All the Difference:
Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 43.
186. Interview of Litigant 4 [nd].
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid. There is a diversity of opinion among Hutterites regarding the appropriateness of
access to technologies such as the Internet. There is even a blog maintained by and about
Hutterites. See Hutterian Brethren, online: <www.hutterites.org>.
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mach, and I wrote him a couple letters, but seems like everything falls on deaf ears,
they keep writing us back that ... the Supreme Court ruled that you have to have a
photo on your driver’s licence, and there’s no other way out.189

For government officials, the Court’s decision signalled an end to the
discussion. From this litigant’s perspective, however, the decision was neither final
nor properly binding. At the time of the interview, the litigant explained that his
community would not alter its practices: “we’re not gonna take a photo.”190
Moreover, the litigant was still hopeful for a change in policy. Alberta was set
to have a new premier as the governing Progressive Conservative party was in the
midst of a new leadership contest: “right now we’re waiting for a new premier in
the province of Alberta … so maybe we can talk some sense into him.”191 To my
knowledge, no new agreement has been reached since then.

V. CONCLUSIONS
Participant narratives recurrently raised the theme of cross-cultural communication. This theme was also prominent in the litigation documents. In all the cases
under review, litigants sought to explain a norm of religious practice by reference
to the background justifications and values that underpinned them. In Amselem,
those who sought the right to build their own succoth situated the practice against
the background justification of a system of biblical commandments that orient
their lives. The values offered to make sense of the practice included anti-materialism and humility before a supreme being. The claimants addressed the dispute
between the parties about the nature of the practice—whether one was obliged to
build a succah on one’s own balcony—with reference to the value of maintaining
a joyous atmosphere around the holiday. In Multani, the claimants presented the
kirpan practice as congruent with values adopted by Canadian constitutional
culture: resistance to oppression, defending the defenseless, and the protection
of minorities. More general values associated with Sikhism—sexual equality and
cultural integration—were also drawn on to situate and familiarize the kirpan. In
Wilson Colony, the practice of avoiding photographs and imagery was explained
in reference to a shared cultural artefact—the Ten Commandments—but also
with reference to the value of anti-idolatry and the background justification of

189. Interview of Litigant 4 [nd] [emphasis added]. While the language here is perhaps ableist, the
expression conveys the litigant’s perception of not being heard or understood.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
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obedience to God. The Colony members also sought to connect this practice to
the value of communalism that orients their daily lives.
In addition to dialogues about specific religious practices, all three cases
involved dialogues around the norm of religious freedom. In Amselem, the
litigants put forward an expert witness to emphasize the obligatory nature of
their succah practice and insisted on the inappropriateness of state courts ruling
on matters of religious doctrine. The former was aimed at bringing the practice
within the ambit of religious freedom, and the latter at appealing to notions
of the separation of religion and state in order to give content to the norm of
religious freedom. In Multani, the litigants were concerned more specifically
with the norm of reasonableness as it applies to religious freedom and sought
to paint the kirpan’s exclusion as unreasonable in light of the other potentially
dangerous objects routinely allowed into public schools. In Wilson Colony, the
primary thrust of the Colony’s argument was to minimize the potential benefit
of a universal licence requirement, playing out their claim according to the value
of a cost-benefit analysis. However, by emphasizing the collective aspects of their
practice, the claimants displayed a value-based difference with the prevailing
Canadian jurisprudence on religious freedom.
With respect to the Court’s responses to these efforts at cross-cultural
communication, the majority decision in Wilson Colony represents a low point of
cross-cultural communication. There, the majority failed to properly appreciate
the centrality of collectivism to the religious life of the Hutterite community.
This can be seen as both a failure of respect for the litigants and a failure of
self-awareness regarding Canadian law’s normative commitments to individualism. The Court’s decision in Multani stands out as a success by refusing to
paint the kirpan as a weapon and treating it instead as a religious object. This
was a central concern of the litigants and the intervening World Sikh Organization, and both were gratified by the Court’s reasons in this regard. In my view,
this success is explained in large measure by the way the litigants emphasized the
affinity in values between Sikh and Canadian constitutional cultures. It was also
the case in which the Court demonstrated the highest degree of self-awareness,
taking seriously the comparison between the kirpan and other potentially
dangerous objects that are accepted in schools. The Amselem case represents
something of a middle ground. While the Court showed a good understanding
of the significance of the succah practice in the litigants’ lives, it adopted a highly
individualistic view of religion that may fail to capture the communal aspects of
some religious practices. In sum, the three cases under review show the courts’
potential to be both successful and unsuccessful at cross-cultural communication.

KISLOWICZ, FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS? 189

Though courts and counsel tended to present their views as culturally neutral,
they also demonstrated the capacity for both self-awareness and respect, leading
to a greater understanding of minority practices and a greater sense on the part of
participants that the courts recognized their identities.
It is striking in this study that the litigants who felt the courts understood them
were also the litigants who were successful in the final result. It is likely that the
ultimate result in the cases coloured the litigants’ perceptions of their experiences.
I do not mean to suggest here that successful cross-cultural communication will
always lead to religious freedom claimants obtaining their desired outcome from
the courts. The Multani court may have come to a different conclusion if, for
example, there had been persuasive evidence about the kirpan’s dangerousness in
comparison to other sharp objects. The Wilson Colony court could have arrived
at the same result while giving stronger recognition to the collective aspects of
Hutterite religious experience. This may have left the claimants feeling they had
been misunderstood, but not due to a failure of communication. Successful crosscultural communication requires not agreement but maintenance of respect and
humility in attempting to understand one another.
This being said, there is good reason to believe that better cross-cultural
communication leads to better decision-making. An incomplete understanding of
the practice necessarily means an incomplete analysis of the impact of a particular
policy on religious freedom. In Amselem, such a complete understanding may
have been unnecessary because of the weakness of the other co-owners’ interests.
Multani and Wilson Colony, however, show the impact of cross-cultural communication on proportionality analyses. The Multani Court was able to appreciate
the costs to baptized Sikhs of not wearing a kirpan, and thus was able to place
the school’s arguments in proper perspective. The majority of the Wilson Colony
Court, on the other hand, was unable to appreciate the full effects on Hutterites of
enforcing a universal driver’s licence photo requirement, in part because it failed
to bridge the difference between individualist and collectivist understandings of
religious obligation. In contrast, the dissenting judges in Wilson Colony showed a
deeper appreciation of the Hutterites’ collectivist worldview.192 This suggests that
the values of cross-cultural communication may not require a change in the law,
but rather vigilance on the part of judges to maintain respect and self-awareness
when interpreting evidence about religious practices.

192. Wilson Colony, supra note 3 at paras 130-32, 164-70.

